responsible to such third person. Bell v. Mason, 10 Vermont, 509. AVERAGE. A vessel bound to Philadelphia, and having a large sum of specie on board belonging to the defendants, arrived in the bay of the Delaware in the month of December, and after encountering various difficulties, was stranded and ice bound, near Reedy Island, in a situation of imminent peril. The specie was carried over the ice to the shore, and by land to Philadelphia, where it was delivered to the defendants. Some weeks afterwards the vessel reached Philadelphia in safety, with the remainder of the cargo, which had been in whole or in part discharged into lighters, and afterwards reshipped. Held, that the defendants were liable to contribute to the charges and expenses incurred after the landing of the specie, as general average. Bevan v. Bank of the United States, 4 Wharton, 301. 2. If a vessel be on a lee shore in a heavy gale, and the captain find it necessary for the preservation of the lives of the crew to run the vessel ashore, and accordingly they slip the anchor and put the vessel before the wind and she strikes the shore and is lost, and it appears that she would have gone ashore at all events, it is not a case of general average. Meech v. Robinson, 4 Wharton, 360. BAILMENT. (Rights of general owner out of possession.) If

the general owner of chattels part with the possession for a definite term, he cannot sustain trespass or trover for an injury done to the thing, during the continuance of the term. Swift v. Moseley, 10 Vermont, 208.

2. (Same.) But if the bailee apply the thing to a different use from that for which it was bailed, his interest is determined, and the bailor may sustain trover for the injury, against all concerned in the transaction. For instance, if the hirer of a chattel for a year sell it during the year to one knowing his interest, the owner of the chattel may sustain trover against the purchaser.

Ib.

BANKS. (How far liable for note.) A bank which receives a note for collection, and when it is overdue places it in the hands

of a notary in the usual course, is not liable for the neglect of the notary to give notice to an indorser. Bellemire v. Bank

of the United States, 4 Wharton, 105. BANK-CHECK. (Forged.) Where a forged check purporting to be drawn by a customer on a bank, where such customer keeps a deposit, is paid at such bank to an innocent holder who paid a valuable consideration for it, and who had no knowledge of the forgery, such bank cannot recover of such holder the amount so paid. Bank of St. Albans v. Farmers' and Mechanics' Bank, 10 Vermont, 141.

2. (Same.) If such check is purchased by another bank, in good

faith, and is received in the course of business by the drawee, and passed to the credit of the bank that purchased it, and notice of the forgery is not given the bank so purchasing it until two months afterwards the bank, on which the check purported to have been drawn, thereby makes the loss its own. Ib.

3. (Same.) In such a case, notice of the forgery should be immediately given, to entitle the drawee to a recovery. lb. BILL OF EXCHANGE AND PROMISSORY NOTE. (Guaranty not negotiable.) Underneath the signature of the payee of a negotiable note indorsed by him in blank, were written the following words signed by the defendant: "I guarantee the payment of semiannual interest on this note as well as the principal." It was held, that such guaranty was not negotiable, in itself, nor made so by being written upon a negotiable instrument; and therefore that no action could be maintained on such guaranty by one who subsequently became the holder of the note. True v. Fuller, 21 Pick. 140.

2. (Surety released by parol.) A parol declaration by the holder of a promissory note to the surety, after the note has fallen due, that he will exonerate the surety and look to the principal, is a good defence in an action by the holder against the security; and if the relation of the makers is not apparent on the face of the note, parol evidence is admissible to prove that the defendant signed as surety, and that this was known to the holder at the time when he made such declaration. Harris v. Brooks, 21 Pick. 195.

3. (Reasonable time.) A demand on the maker of a note payable on demand, made on the seventh day from the date, was held to have been made within a reasonable time, to charge the indorser. Seaver v. Lincoln, 21 Pick. 267.

4. (Where drawer has no effects in acceptor's hands.) The drawer of a bill of exchange, having no effects in the hands of the acceptor from the time when the bill was drawn to the time when it became due, was held liable without proof of demand and notice of non-payment. Kinsley v. Robinson, 21 Pick. 327.

5. (Acceptor competent witness.) In an action by the indorsee against the drawer of a bill of exchange, the acceptor is a competent witness to prove that he has not had in his hands any funds of the drawer.

Ib.

6. (Bank may sue on note payable to cashier.)

Where a pro

missory note was made payable "to the cashier of the Commercial Bank or his order," and the consideration proceeded from the bank, it was held, that an action on the note might be maintained in the name of the bank as the promisee. mercial Bank v. French, 21 Pick. 486.

Com

7. (Check on bank.) A check upon a bank is transferable like a bill of exchange; and the mere circumstance of its being dated on a day after that on which it was taken by the holder, is not sufficient, in an action against him by the holder, to let the drawer into a defence of want of consideration between him and the payee. Walker v. Geisse, 4 Wharton, 252.

8. (Same.) Nor is it sufficient to let the drawer into such defence that the check was taken by the plaintiff in payment of an antecedent debt. Ib.

9. (Alteration.) A joint and several promissory note was signed

by A., B. and C.; and afterwards A. acknowledged his signature to a witness, who subscribed his name in the presence of A. and of the payee, without stating that he witnessed only the signature of A. In an action against the three makers it was held, that this was not such an alteration of the instrument as to discharge B. and C. Beary v. Haines, 4 Wharton, 17.

BOND. (To indemnify against claims due from partnership.) In a breach of the conditions of a probate bond, many things, which will not amount to a legal defence, will reduce the damages. Probate Court v. Bates and another, 10 Vermont,

285.

BOOK-ACCOUNT. (Time of making charge.) Where a declaration on book is filed as an offset to a suit pending in a county court, and exceptions are taken to the decision of the county court, accepting the report of the auditor, such decision is an interlocutory judgment, and the exceptions cannot be carried to the supreme court until after a final judgment shall have been rendered in the original action; and if an entry of such exceptions is made in the supreme court it will be treated as a misentry. Fisk v. Herrick, 10 Vermont, 67. BOUNDARY LINE. (Mistake in.) A mutual recognition, by adjoining proprietors, of a wrong line, and their acquiescence in such line, unless accompanied by a continued possession by one or both, for fifteen years, is not conclusive as to their title. Crowell v. Bebee, 10 Vermont, 33.

2. (Mode of calculating.) A grant or exception of a certain number of acres off the west end of a lot in a rectangular form, and the sides being toward the cardinal points, is, in legal intendment, to be divided from the lot by a line parallel with the lot lines. Rich v. Elliott, 10 Vermont, 211.

3. (Same.) Parol evidence is not admissible to contradict such intendment, and show that the parties intended the line to be neither straight nor parallel with the lot lines. Ib. CARRIERS. (Liability of.) The defendant, who was the owner of a line of vessels engaged in transporting goods from Philadelphia to Baltimore, received certain goods belonging to the plaintiff, on board of one of his vessels, and gave a receipt in the following words: "Rec'd on board Hand's Line for Baltimore, via Chesapeake and Delaware Canal, from J. B." (the plaintiff,)" 100 slaughter hides on deck, which I promise to deliver to J. D. at Baltimore, the dangers of the navigation, fire, leakage and breakage excepted, he or they paying freight

eight dollars, and porterage $1,50." The vessel left Philadelphia, and on arriving at the mouth of the canal, the captain was informed that the locks were out of order, and that he could not be allowed to pass through the canal. He then proceeded down the bay, and out to sea, with the intention of going round to Baltimore, but in a gale of wind the vessel struck on a shoal, and with the cargo was totally lost. Evidence was given on the trial that the hides had been purchased by the plaintiff, and there was no evidence of any property in J. D. the consignee : Held, (1st) That this was a contract to carry the goods to Baltimore through the canal. (2d) That the circumstances did not excuse the deviation from that route. (3d) That the clause in the receipt excepting "the dangers of the navigation," did not apply to the case of the canal being impassable by inevitable accident or otherwise. (4th) That the plaintiff was entitled to maintain an action against the carrier for the loss of the goods. (5th) That the value of the goods was the proper measure of damages. Hand v. Baynes, 4 Wharton, 204.

CASE. (Turning into highway trespassing horses.) A person,

finding horses trespassing on his land, may turn them into the highway, and is not liable, though they may be lost in consequence of being so turned into the highway. Humphrey v. Douglass, 10 Vermont, 71.

CHANCERY. (Mistake in regard to title.) In a contract for the sale of land, if both parties are under mistake in regard to the title of the vendor, which wss supposed to be perfect, but proves void, this court will relieve the vendee from the contract. Hadlochs v. Williams, 10 Vermont, 570. CONFUSION OF GOODS.

(Consequences of and liabilities from.) If A intentionally intermingle his own goods with others of the same quality and value belonging to B, but which A supposed to be his own, such intermixture does not divest A of his property in those which did in fact belong to him; and if B, knowing that a part of the goods belong to A, take away the whole, he is responsible to A in trespass, for the value of A's goods; or if he take the goods, without such knowledge,