STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU. M. purchased lead of the plaintiff at Newcastle, without specifying any place of delivery. After a time, M. desired that it should be forwarded to him in London, and the plaintiff gave M.'s agent at Newcastle an order on his servant for its delivery. The agent indorsed the order to a keelman, who received the lead and put it on board a vessel for London. The vessel arrived in London the 21st June, and the defendants, as wharfingers, undertook the delivery of the lead. On that day M. failed; on the 23d and 24th M. demanded the lead from the captain of the vessel, who refused to deliver it, although the freight was tendered, alleging that the defendants had stopped it on account of the failure of M. On the 28th a letter arrived from the plaintiffs, ordering the stoppage of the lead, which was then on board a lighter of the defendants : Held, that the transitus was not at an end, and that the plaintiff was in time to stop the lead. (3 T. R. 466 ; 7 T. R. 440; 3 East, 381; 1 M. & W. 20; 2 Bing. N. C. 81.) Jackson v. Nichol, 5 Bing. N. C. 508. VENDOR AND PURCHASER. (Lien of unpaid vendor of goods.) The defendants sold the plaintiffs wheat, for which the plaintiffs were to pay by a draft on a London banker, to be remitted on receipt of the invoice and bill of lading. The defendants delivered the wheat to a carrier by water, and sent the bill of lading to the plaintiffs, but retook the wheat and sold it, because the plaintiffs failed to send a draft on a London banker according to their contract: Held, that the plaintiffs could not sue the defendants in trover for the wheat. (4 B. & C. 941.) Wilmshurst v. Bowker, 5 Bing. N. C. 541.

WITNESS. (Competency.) In case against a broker for negligently delivering goods without payment, the plaintiff's called their servant, whose duty it was to deliver under the orders of the defendant, and who had delivered without such orders: Held, that he was an interested witness, and therefore not competent to prove that the defendant was informed of such delivery in time to stop the goods and prevent loss to the plaintiffs, and that he neglected to do so. (1 Campb. 251; Peake, 117; 8 Taunt. 454.) Boorman v. Browne, 1 P. & D. 364.

EQUITY.

Selections from 3 Mylne & Craig, Part 3; 2 Keen, Part 3 ; 8 Simons, Part 4; and 3 Younge & Collyer, Part 2.

BILL OF EXCHANGE.

(Delivery up of.) Where a party sues in equity for the delivery up of a bill to which, it appears, he has a good defence at law, it is not sufficient for him to show that such defence at law, as it depends upon testimony, is liable to fail through the death of witnesses, he must also show that the defendant in equity came into possession of the bill in a wrongful manner, or that he is not equitably entitled to recover upon the same. Where the grounds of the legal defence are apparent on the face of the instrument, equity will in no case interfere to have it delivered up. Jones v. Lane, Y. & C. 280. DEMURRER. (Amended bill.) A defendant having fully answered the original bill, afterwards demurred to the whole of the amended bill, though the bill as amended did not materially vary the case made by the original bill, and contained many of the statements in it which the defendant had previously answered: Held, in the first place, that the Court might look at the record for the purpose of comparing the two bills with each other and with the answer; and in the second place, it being admitted that the result of the comparison would be as above stated, that the demurrer was overruled by the answer. Ellice v. Goodson, M. & C. 653.

DOMICIL. (Evidence of.) An inquiry having been directed as to the domicil of a testator who died at Amsterdam in 1696; it appeared that testator, who was a Jew, belonged to the Jewish synagogue of London as well as to that of Amsterdam, and that in the year of his death he had, as appeared from the will, an establishment in London, but that he had previously to his death greatly diminished his contributions to the Jew synagogue of that place, and the amount of legacies in his will was stated in Dutch money, and the provisions of his will were in some respects repugnant to the law of England, but agreeable to the

law and custom of Holland: Held, that he was a domiciled Dutchman at the time of his death. Bernal v. Bernal, M. & C. 559, (note).

INSTITUTION OF SUIT. (Authority of plaintiff—Costs.) Where a suit had been instituted without the authority of one of the plaintiffs, and such plaintiff had rights at variance with the other co-plaintiffs: His name was, at his own instance, after replication filed, ordered to be struck out, and his costs of the suit and the application were ordered to be paid by the solicitor who filed the bill, Tabbernor v. Tabbernor, Keen, 679.

PARTIES.

(Husband and wife-Misjoinder.) In a suit to obtain the benefit of a bequest to the separate use of the wife, it is improper to join the husband and wife as co-plaintiffs, but the wife should sue by her next friend, the husband being a defendant. Owden v. Campbell, Sim. 551. PARTNERSHIP. (Suit against successive firms.) An action having been brought by A upon a covenant entered into with her in conjunction with two others, who were then her partners in a firm, from which A afterwards retired, a bill was filed, by the defendant at law stating that A, upon her retirement, had assigned all her interest in the partnership business and debts to B, who thereby became and still was a member of the firm, and stating that by various transactions with B and the continuing firm, to some of which A was a party, and by various payments to the new firm, the debt had been extinguished; and the bill prayed for an injunction to restrain the action, and for an account against the firm in its different states, and also to set aside a sale made for payment of the debt. To this bill a general demurrer was put in, which was allowed, partly on the ground that if it could be proved that A had authorized the new firm to receive the debt, that would be a defence at law, and unless she had done so, the plaintiff had no equity; partly because the plaintiff had no right to mix up the successive partners with his account against A, though there might be ground for a discovery of the transactions between A and B; partly because the bill as against the successive partners was for discovery beforehand

of what they might say as witnesses at law. Jones v. Maund, Y. & C. 347. PLEADING. (Demurrer to discovery.) A bill being filed by a purchaser to set aside a contract for purchase of a secret in trade, which bill inquired into the nature of the alleged secret, of which it denied the existence, the defendant demurred to that part of the discovery sought which related to the nature of the secret: Held, that he ought to have taken the objection by plea, this not being one of those cases in which a demurrer to the discovery alone is allowed. Carter v. Goetze, Keen, 581, 2. (Plea to discovery.) Where a defendant is desirous of pleading a settled account as a defence to the whole bill, which bill charges that such settled account, if any, was fraudulent and collusive, the proper mode is to plead to the whole relief, and to all the discovery, except that which is made by the answer; and a plea to the whole bill, except such parts as relate to the charges of fraud and collusion, is informal; but the plea being right in substance, the defendant in such case was allowed to amend. Davies v. Davies, Keen, 534.

POWER. (Construction-Extent of.) A bequest to trustees, in trust for A for life, and after her decease in trust for such persons and for such purposes as she should appoint, and in default of appointment in trust for her children, but if she should have no children, then in trust for the testator's other daughters : Held, to confer upon A a general power of appointment. Mackinley v. Sison, Sim. 561.

2. (Husband and wife.) A power of appointing personalty to a woman (who was unmarried when the power was created,) held to be well executed by an appointment to the husband, as he thereby took no greater interest than he would if the appointment had been simply to the wife. Hewitt v. Lord Dacre, Keen, 622.

3. (Trust raised from power-Conversion.) The words, “I do empower my wife to sell all my estates whatsoever, and the money arising from such sale, together with my personal estate, she my said wife shall and may devise and proportion among 12

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my children, as she shall think proper, or as she shall direct by will: Held, to confer a life estate on the widow, with remainder in default of appointment to the children in equal shares.

Held, also, to be a conversion of the real estate (which was in fact not sold by the widow) as between the real and personal representatives of a deceased child. Grieveson v. Kirsopp, Keen, 653.

PRINCIPAL AND SURETY. (Work by contract.) By a contract for the performance of certain works, it was stipulated that three fourths of the work, as finished, should be paid for every two months, the remaining fourth to be paid for upon completion of the whole. For the purpose it was said of assisting the contractor, more than three fourths of the work done were paid for, without the consent of the sureties for due performance of the contract, (such extra payments exceeding the amount of the penalty in the bond given by the sureties): Held, that the sureties were thereby discharged of their responsibility for the due performance of the contract. Calvert v. The London Dock Company, Keen, 638.

PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS. (Admitted possession, with claim of privilege.) Where a defendant by his answer admitted possession of documents, but stated that several of them were privileged, as written since the institution of the suit: He was, on a motion for production of documents, allowed to withhold such as he stated by affidavit to have been written after the said time. Parsons v. Robertson, Keen, 605. SOLICITOR AND CLIENT. (Negligence and mistake.) Where

a solicitor had been guilty of great remissness in the conduct of a suit, and had ultimately, through ignorance of the practice of the court, allowed publication to pass without witnesses being examined on his client's behalf; on the motion of the latter, publication was enlarged, the solicitor paying the costs of the application. White v. Hillacre, Y. & C. 278.

2. (Privileged communication.) In a bill filed by insurance company A, against company B, and against their solicitor, to set aside a policy of insurance upon a life effected by the latter