CICERO

(B. C. 106-43.)

MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, the great Roman orator, statesman, and philosopher, was born at Arpinum, a town of Latium, about seventy miles from Rome, on the 3d of January, B. C. 106. His father, of the same name, was a man of wealth, and Cicero received the best education that could be given him, applying special study to law. He acquired early distinction as an orator, and was little past thirty years of age when he began to be called to high offices in the state. In the year 63 B. c. he became consul, and performed his greatest service to the Roman Republic in defeating the conspiracy of Catiline. To accomplish this he was obliged to overstep the bounds of law, which gave his enemies an opportunity to assail him with prosecutions when his term of office had expired. He withdrew from Rome in consequence, and resided for a time in Greece, but was triumphantly recalled in September, 57 B. c. On the outbreak of the civil war between Cæsar and Pompey, Cicero, after long hesitation, took sides with the Pompeians. The victorious Cæsar treated him with magnanimity, and he lived in undisturbed privacy until Cæsar's death, devoting himself to the composition of philosophical and rhetorical works, many of which have survived. to claim the undying admiration of the world. After Cæsar's assassination, Cicero made common cause with the assassins, and ruined himself by vehement orations against Marc Antony. He was doomed by the defeat of the republicans. His name was put into the list of the proscribed, when Antony, Octavian, and Lepidus agreed on the destruction of their enemies, and he was slain by a party of their soldiers on the 7th of December, B. c. 43.

Among the more philosophical works of Cicero "The Tusculan Disputations" hold a high place. They are discussions

supposed to have taken place in Cicero's villa at Tusculum, in the mountains near Rome.

THE GOOD THAT MAKES LIFE HAPPY.

(From "The Tusculan Disputations" of Cicero ; literally translated by C. D. Yonge.)

As the perturbations of the mind make life miserable, and tranquillity renders it happy; and as these perturbations are of two sorts, grief and fear, proceeding from imagined evils, and as immoderate joy and lust arise from a mistake about what is good, and as all these feelings are in opposition to reason and counsel; when you see a man at ease, quite free and disengaged from such troublesome commotions, which are so much at variance with one another, can you hesitate to pronounce such an one a happy man? Now the wise man is always in such a disposition, therefore the wise man is always happy. Besides, every good is pleasant; whatever is pleasant may be boasted and talked of; whatever may be boasted of is glorious, but whatever is glorious is certainly laudable, and whatever is laudable doubtless, also, honourable; whatever, then, is good is honourable; (but the things which they reckon as goods, they themselves do not call honourable ;) therefore what is honourable alone is good. Hence it follows that a happy life is comprised in honesty alone. Such things, then, are not to be called or considered goods, when a man may enjoy an abundance of them, and yet be most miserable. Is there any doubt but that a man who enjoys the best health, and who has strength and beauty, and his senses flourishing in their utmost quickness and perfection; suppose him likewise, if you please, nimble and active, nay, give him riches, honours, authority, power, glory; now, I say, should this

person, who is in possession of all these, be unjust, intemperate, timid, stupid, or an idiot, could you hesitate to call such an one miserable? What, then, are those goods in the possession of which you may be very miserable? Let us see if a happy life is not made up of parts of the same nature, as a heap implies a quantity of grain of the same kind. And if this be once admitted, happiness must be compounded of different good things which alone are honourable; if there is any mixture of things of another sort with these, nothing honourable can proceed from such a composition; now, take away honesty, and how can you imagine anything happy? For whatever is good is desirable on that account; whatever is desirable must certainly be approved of; whatever you approve of must be looked on as acceptable and welcome. You must consequently impute dignity to this; and if so, it must necessarily be laudable; therefore, everything that is laudable is good. Hence it follows that what is honourable is the only good. And should we not look upon it in this light, there will be a great many things which we must call good.

I forbear to mention riches, which, as any one, let him be ever so unworthy, may have them, I do not reckon amongst goods; for what is good is not attainable by all. I pass over notoriety and popular fame, raised by the united voice of knaves and fools. Even things which are absolute nothings may be called goods; such as white teeth, handsome eyes, a good complexion, and what was commended by Euryclea, when she was washing Ulysses's feet, the softness of his skin and the mildness of his discourse. If you look on these as goods, what greater encomiums can the gravity of a philosopher be entitled to than the wild opinion of the vulgar and the thoughtless crowd? The Stoics give the name of excellent and choice

to what the others call good: they call them so indeed, but they do not allow them to complete a happy life. But these others think that there is no life happy without them; or, admitting it to be happy, they deny it to be the most happy. But our opinion is that it is the most happy, and we prove it from that conclusion of Socrates. For thus that author of philosophy argued that as the disposition of a man's mind is, so is the man: such as the man is, such will be his discourse: his actions will correspond with his discourse, and his life with his actions. But the disposition of a good man's mind is laudable: the life, therefore, of a good man is laudable: it is honourable, therefore, because laudable: the unavoidable conclusion from which is that the life of good men is happy.

THE SERMON ON THE MOUNT

"WHAT is the Sermon on the Mount? It is the moral law of the kingdom of Christ, or in other words it occupies in the New Testament the place which in the Old Testament is occupied by the Ten Commandments. It is thus an excellent example of the relation of the two divine testaments,' or rather covenants, to one another. . . . We may say with truth that the Sermon on the Mount supersedes the Ten Commandments; but it supersedes them by including them in a greater, deeper, and more positive whole." CHARLES GORE, "The Sermon on the Mount," ch. i.

(Matthew v., Revised Version.)

And seeing the multitudes, he went up into the mountain and when he had sat down, his disciples came unto him and he opened his mouth and taught them, saying, Blessed are the poor in spirit: for theirs is the kingdom of heaven.

:

Blessed are they that mourn: for they shall be comforted.

Blessed are the meek: for they shall inherit the earth. Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after righteousness for they shall be filled.

Blessed are the merciful: for they shall obtain mercy. Blessed are the pure in heart: for they shall see God. Blessed are the peacemakers: for they shall be called sons of God.

Blessed are they that have been persecuted for righteousness' sake: for theirs is the kingdom of heaven.