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plies the same cutting of the Gordian knot, the same appeal to ignorance, which is implied in the use of the word instinctive. If, however, we can restrict its signification in our minds, we shall do well. Let it mean no more than that the feelings, &c. to which it is applied, are the necessary results from those powers which the Supreme Being has implanted in us; in fact, let it have the same general meaning as natural, with rather more force, denoting the necessity of their arising from the powers which are given us, and we shall not be giving way to those erroneous views which we must unlearn before we can acquire truth. 40. We need not go far for instances which will explain the law of transference. Suppose a person acquiring another language, the French, for instance; he learns the meaning of a French word by means of the corresponding English -word; by degrees, as the French word becomes familiar to him, it is understood without the English word being thought of Here the signification, that is, the idea connected with the word, may be called A, the English word B, and the French word C; by frequent connection between A and C, by means of B, A is transferred to C, the signification is transferred to the French word, so that B, the English word, is no longer wanting to form the link of union.—When a young person has acquired some facility in construing French, he generally reads his French work in English; but when he has acquired a pretty complete knowledge of the language, he reads it in French; that is, he understands it without the intervention of the corresponding English words.-Those who are conversant with short-hand can read it without thinking of the long-hand; yet they learnt this through the medium of the long-hand words.-Those who have long learnt to read, and who have read much to themselves, seldom think of the sound of the words when they are reading to themselves. When we are pretty familiar with a subject, a single glance of the eye over a page of a clear printed book will convey to us the idea of its contents, when perhaps not a single word has particularly attracted our attention, when certainly there has not been time for the mind to think of the sound of the words. We do not recommend this habit of reading to young persons; but simply state a fact, which is very convenient and useful to the mind, which has gone through sufficient discipline of

accuracy, &c. Now it is obvious, that in almost all cases, persons learn to understand written words through the medium of spoken words.-One more instance, and we have done with mere illustration. Those who are familiar with writing never think of the printed word, unless any particular circumstance call it to the mind. Yet there are very few instances in which the written word is not connected with the spoken word, by means of the before learnt printed word. 41. I now proceed to show the application of this law, in explaining certain phenomena of belief, and the origin of disinterested affections. I am not now to attempt the explanation of the formation of the complex feeling which we call belief, nor of those complex states of mind which we call affections; but supposing them formed to explain some facts respecting them, that is, to show how these facts accord with the general law of association which I have been stating.—Belief is transferable from the reasoning to the result of that reasoning. Suppose a proposition depends for its truth upon a great number of other propositions; if, as we go along, every step is believed to be true, and every connection of one step with another appears to be a just one, the feeling of belief is successively transferred from one step to another, till at last we come to the result, the proposition which we wish to prove, and the feeling will be connected with this, and will remain with it, when all the steps by which its truth was shewn are entirely lost from the view of the mind. Every one admits this; and every one who has gone through the process knows it to be so.-There are almost innumerable instances in which we find the feeling of belief connected with ideas, without our being able at once to say, or even to say at all, how we acquire the connection. In this instance some philosophers refer to certain instinctive principles, by which we are necessarily led to believe, without any further reason than that our mental constitution compels it. But we need not resort to such hypotheses; they do great injury, by checking the researches of the intellect, and in some cases, by leading people to suppose opinions well founded, which have no further ground than an almost accidental, or, at any rate, unjust transfer of belief, by means of what was itself, perhaps, entitled to no belief—There are certain results of reflection and observation, which we call

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experience; and it is generally wise to trust to them. But before a man yields to his experience, in oppostion to the clear evidence of others, or to wellfounded and well connected reasonings,

he should consider what experience is,

and on what ground he has connected belief with it. He will find that belief is not a necessary attendant upon his experience, but that it has been connected with it by means of intermediate links, which might themselves have no satisfactory claim to belief. For instance, if a man has not observed accurately, or inas not a correct judgment, his experience may not be worth any thing, nor entitled to any belief. Now, in many cases, it is almost impossible to recal the intermediate links, in order to prove to ourselves the correctness of our experi

ence, and yet we must act upon it; this

shows the importance of cultivating in early life those habits of cool judgment and accurate observation, which shall give us a full right to believe, and act upon our belief, in the results of reflection and observation ; but some truths, it may be thought, have a necessary connection with belief. We admit that there are truths which are so accordant with all the grounds of belief, that they instantaneously excite the belief of those who have had the opportunity of knowing those grounds, but no further. You immediately believe, that 2+2=4; and you would think that man destitute of common sense who denied it, or who did not immediately admit it. Yet we are well convinced that the belief is formed in consequence of a number of external impressions; or, to state it more familiarly, by frequently counting, in the early part of childhood. We perhaps have not the power of discovering the exact steps by which we have ourselves proceeded to the belief of this truth; but we can observe them in some good measure in others; and we can trace them in ourselves, in similar circumstances. Often belief in such truths is formed through the medium of parental authority, or that of instructors, and it is probable, that in many instances children know no more why 12×12=144, than that they find it so in their multiplication tables; but where it has been formed by trials of the truth, those trials are forgotten, and the truth alone is remembered.—We should gladly enlarge more on these points, but what has been already said will probably answer the two purposes which we have in view; to show the ope

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ration of association in transferring belief; and in leading to the inference, that belief ought not to be regarded as a proof of truth; and yet, that the being unable to point out all the grounds of belief is not any reason why that belief should be given up. 42. Two opposite opinions have long been entertained and are still often advanced, respecting the disinterestedness of the human mind; some have maintained, that the mind, in all its feelings and promptings to actions, is actuated by selfish motives; that, in fact, there is no action or feeling which can be called disinterested. Others have with more success maintained, that the mind can be, and of. ten is, disinterested; that a person frequently performs an action tending to the good of others, in a greater or less degree, without the remotest reference to himself, with no other motive than a desire to do the good which is the effect of the action. The degrading system of the former is seldom adopted but by speculative men, who have been led by circumstances, happily not universal, to see merely the dark side of human nature, and to form a more gloomy picture of its selfishness than truth would allow; or by others who have expected too much from the beautiful speculations of theory, and having been disappointed by comparing them with their own feelings in many instances,

or with the general conduct of men, have

thence gone to the unfounded opinion, that all the actions of all men are selfish. If the opinion of those who maintain the disinterestedness of the human mind had not been carried to an extreme, it would have been attended with but little inconvenience; but unhappily its virtuous advocates have thought disinterestedness an innate principle of the mind, and have considered it as the first step towards true worth of character, whereas it is in reality the last; and have, therefore, decked the commencement of virtue in colours which belong only to its completion: and hence two practical ill consequences have followed; some persons have neglected the culture of disinterestedness, both in their own minds and in those of others, from supposing it to be a necessary quality of the mind; and others have been driven to despair, on comparing the representations of theory with the faulty state of their own minds; supposing that they could never attain to what is considered as alone entitled to the appellation of virtue.—The more correct views, surely, are, that disinterestedness is the last stage of an affection; that it may be hastened or retarded, by attention or neglect of the culture of that affection; and that disinterestedness, as the general character of the mind, is the highest point of excellence, and what should be our object, but can only be acquired by a long course of religious culture.—When an affection has arrived at its most complete state, in which it has no further end than its own immediate object (that is, when the object is desired for its own sake), the affection may be called disinterested; but as this term would thus be applied, not only to the worthy, but the baneful affections, we should be compelled to speak of disinterested cruelty, disinterested avarice, &c. we shall therefore call those affections which are in their ultimate state ultimate affections.—Premising this, we shall adduce some instances which will explain the progress of an affection, from the state in which the object of it is a mean, to that in which the object of it becomes the sole end; that is, in which it is an ultimate affection. 43. The most simple instance, and what is frequently adduced for this purpose, is the love of money. Money is first an object of pleasurable feeling, merely as a means of procuring other things which are regarded as objects of desire. For a moment we may sometimes think of it as having some intrinsic value, independently of its utility as a means; but we may satisfy ourselves that this is not the case, by observing how little it is an object of interest to children, who have not heard much about it, or seen it employed, or employed it themselves. A child is perhaps pleased with a piece of money as a plaything, but nothing further; and children sometimes advance considerably far in life before they feel its value. E. (a boy of 7 years old) was presented by his father with half a crown, as a reward for avery successful and persevering effort; he was delighted with the approbation which was shewn him, and as far as the money was a mark of that approbation it pleased him; but obviously nothing further. In small families children generally learn the value of money early, and we therefore mention the circumstance as an illustration of what we have just said, that originally it is merely desired as a mean. As persons advance in life, money is continually found to be the mean of a great number and variety of the sources of present enjoyment; hence pleasurable feelings are continually connected with it, and it becomes more and more an object

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of desire. In this stage of the progress of the love of money, it is desired as the means of procuring certain pleasurable feelings, without reference to the objects by which those pleasurable feelings are directly produced. And even in this state of it we find an instance of the law of transference. The pleasurable feelings resulting from the objects procured, or to be procured, by money, are associated with the money itself, without reference to those objects. To revert to one of the modes in which the law was proposed; here the pleasurable feelings which purchasable objects produce ; the idea of those objects; and the idea of money; are the three sets of ideas. Money procures the object, the pleasurable feeling; hence the pleasurable feeling becomes connected by means of the intermediate links with money; and hence money becomes an object of desire, without any reference to the means of gratification which it procures.—Here, to use the other statement, the pleasurable feelings may be termed A, the object which produces them B, and money which produces those objects C; and by frequent connection between A and C by means of B, A is transferred to C ; the pleasurable feelings are transferred to the idea of money (and consequently to money itself) and are called up by it without any reference to B, the object by which those pleasurable feelings were excited. The law of transference may in this instance, and many others, be carried one step further. In this state money is desired, on account of the pleasurable feelings with which it is connected; but by degrees the desire is transferred from the pleasurable feelings with which it is connected to money itself, and money is loved for itself, without any reference to those pleasurable feelings. This is so important a fact in our mental constitution, and what can be explained only by association, that we deem no apology necessary for endeavouring so much at length to point out its application. Here A is the desire which is excited by B, the pleasurable feeling connected with C, the idea of money; by means of B, A, the desire, is transferred to C, the idea of the money; and thus the money comes to be desired for itself, without any reference to the pleasurable feelings which it is the means of procuring. In this state the desire of money is become an ultimate affection; it is no longer desired as a means, but as an end; it is desired on its own account. 44. Illustrations of a similar kind might

be offered with respect to the filial, fraternal, and even the parental affections; and it might be shewn that they are only gradually disinterested; but at the same time the natural tendency is to disinterestedness: and that it is only where disinterestedness is opposed by the culture of wrong affections (affections, which, when become ultimate, are ever selfish), and by neglect of those which are in all their stages worthy, and which hasten the progress almost indefinitely, that the mind stops at partial disinterestedness, or sinks into confirmed selfishness.-In opposition to these views, however, it may be advanced by some, that children are usually more disinterested than persons who have had experience in life. We shall make some observations on this point, which will at the same time throw some light on the progress of the filial af. fections. Children often appear disinterested where they are not really so, because we do not take into account the quick changes of their feelings; sometimes setting a light value upon what a few hours, or even minutes, before they were delighted with, and at other times the reverse. Hence they are readily induced to give away what they have before been delighted with, and to make what we erroneously think sacrifices with out an effort.—But again, we are apt to think them disinterested when they give up what they really like, only, or principally, because they thus have a greater share of the pleasures resulting from their obedience to their friend’s praise, or other rewards. Now the approbation of their friends is to children a thing of such value, that praise affords them some of their greatest pleasures. And therefore, when, for the sake of that approbation, they give up play-things or niceties, or any other objects of pleasure, so far from bing disinterested, they are eminently self-interested; but their self-interestedness is of a better kind, one which, with dure care, will prove a most powerful engine in the moral and religious culture of the mind, by increasing the influence of the parent and instructor.—Again, children are in general influenced more by present objects than by future objects, however far superior in their value and durability. Few children early attain such command over themselves as voluntarily to give up a present source of pleasure for a future one; and where it is done, it is rather in compliance with the wishes and injunctions of their friends, than from any comprehensive conception

of the future good. It is an excellent thing to obtain the sacrifice by means of any worthy feeling; all we wish to observe is, that children do not feel the va. lue of future pleasures, and therefore easily yield to that which is most powerful at the time. Hence therefore they appear disinterested, because they cannot calculate the value of the good which they relinquish; and do in reality prefer the greatest present pleasure, or rather they are in reality actuated by the greatest present pleasure.—We do however cheerfully admit that children very often are disinterested; for instance, will obey their parents, will tell the truth, will endeavour to increase the comforts of others, without any reference, director indirect, to any personal gratification; and we admit too that these same children too frequently as they grow up become more selfish, and sometimes the constitutional readiness, with which they have in some instances become disinterested, will be the cause of their becoming selfish, and that to a degree which those of less promise never experience. All this may be easily explained, but we must confine ourselves to the fact, that children in a very early period shew great marks of disinterestedness. Now this may easily occur, especially where there has been proper culture on the part of the parent. Where the approbation of the parent has been made the greatest good, by being uniformly given to that which will promote the real happiness of the child, and where, consequently, prompt and cheerful obedience has been early and steadily cultivated, a tendency to obedience will soon become so habitual as to leave scarcely a wish to deviate, even in cases where obedience requires real sacrifices, and in general to prompt to propriety of conduct, without any reference even to the increase of parental affection, or to the occurring of parental approbation. Obedience is then disinterested: and the affection on which it is founded—the desire of doing whatever a parent directs, is become ultimate. Where this is confirmed by other worthy feelings, the highest effects may be reasonably expected in the moral character; and the foundation will have been laid for that regard to the will of God, which is the beginning and the end of wisdom.—But we need not for this resort to any opinion of innate disinterestedness. Let us observe how it arose from firm but temperate decision on the part of the parents, from an enlightened wish on their part to promote the happiness of their child, by making its present pleasure subordinate to its happiness on the whole, from checking their own irregularities of disposition, so as to raise no suspicion in its mind that their own pleasure was their object, and by aiming to connect, by all the rational means in their power, pleasurable feelings with obedience, painful feelings with disobedience. We suppose there never was yet an instance, where all this was done, and done sufficiently early, where the effect did not follow. And the habit of disinterested obedience may be formed much easier in the earliest period of life than in those further advanced. There are then no opposing habits, which must be checked before obedience can be secured: little pains are quickly forgotten, though their effects remain; future pleasures are thought of but little, and the value of their sacrifice not falsely estimated; above all, the constant connection is formed between good and obedience, by various methods of obedience, and between unpleasant feeling and disobedience.—The desire of obeying parental directions is the feeling which we have been considering ; but precisely the same observations may be made with respect to the wish to increase parental happinesss, and remove parental pains; and where parental influence has acquired such power, we need not go a step further to ascertain the cause of a disinterested love of truth and other virtues. We do not think that a child who has been thoroughly disciplined, so as to have formed the confirmed habit of prompt affectionate obedience, and who has had this feeling transferred to its heavenly parent, by the wise instruction of his earthly parents, will ever wander far and long from the road of duty; but in other cases, where the habit is less confirmed, or not rightly directed, it often falls before the influence of erroneous views as to the efficacy of the means of private happiness, before the constant influence of example, before the influence of disappointment, &c.; but these effects our limits will not allow us to explain; we merely wished to show how disinterestedness might spring up very early in the mind.—These things, so far from giving any countenance to the theory that the human mind is originally disinterested, confirm the theory, that disinterestedness is the growth of custom; and point to various important practical conclusions, which parents will do well to lay to heart, to make the regulating principles of their conduct.

45. We will now proceed to the two last objects which we had in contemplation, the formation of disinterested benevolence, and a disinterested love of duty. Every human being receives his first pleasurable impressions in society. His appetites are gratified by the assistance of his kind; and probably there is no agreeable feeling, which is not in some way or other associated with those who attend him in the period of infancy and childhood. Hence arises sociality, or the pleasure derived from the mere company of others: and, as the child increases in years, the associated pleasure increases almost continually. In the innocent and generally happy period of childhood, he receives all his enjoyments in the company of others; most of his sports and amusements require a playfellow; and if by any untoward circumstances he is prevented from joining his companions, he feels an uneasiness which it is scarcely in his own power to remove, but which vanishes as soon as he can rejoin them.— But his happiness derived from others depends greatly upon the happiness of others. He is happiest when those around him are happy; partly from the contagion of feeling, and partly because his means of happiness considerably depend upon the convenience of others. If his companions are ill, his sources of pleasure are diminished; if his parents are unable to take their customary care of him, he misses it in various ways, he loses the caress of affection, or the little kindnesses of parental tenderness. Hence the comfort and happiness of others necessarily become the object of desire ; and, even in children, it not unfrequently happens, that this desire becomes sufficiently disinterested to forego small pleasures, or endure small pains, in order to increase the comfort of their parents, or to prevent what would diminish it.—Benevolence is that affection which leads us to promote the welfare of others to the best of our power; and general benevolence is founded upon particular benevolence; for instance, upon affection to parents. We have seen the rudiments of it spring up ; and that, in some instances, even in children, it becomes disinterested : but it has been in only one branch, and it will be well to pursue it further.—The endeavour to promote the comfort or welfare of others is almost invariably followed, in the early part of life, with an increase of pleasurable feelings. Parents approve, and tell children that God approves, of those who do good

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