Analysis of Boyle's Disquisition. TĨ

much to weaken one of the best and most successful arguments to convince men that there is a God, and that they ought to admire, praise, and thank Him, I think it my duty to prefer an important truth before my respect to any man, how eminent soever, -that opposes it; and to consider more the glory of the great Author of Nature, than the reputation of any one of her interpre

-ters."

In this admirable dissertation, which exhibits a rare combination of profound philosophy with earnest piety, the truly amiable and accomplished author states at the outset a fourfold distinction, too often overlooked in theological inquiries, between the different kinds of ends which may be supposed to have been contemplated in the constitution of nature, and which must all be taken into account if we would either estimate aright the evidence of design, or guard against the obvious objections which might be founded on a more partial view of the subject. There is a -UNIVERSAL OF SUPREME end, to which every other is subordi-nate and subservient; and this is the manifestation of the Divine glory, Of the subordinate ends, there are several which are distinct, although necessarily connected; such as the COSMICAL ends which are discoverable from the relations established between all the parts of the system, and which impart to it a certain unity, in virtue of which it is seen to be a universe, the product of One Designing Mind; besides these there are certain ANIMAL ends, discoverable from the relations of parts in beings endued with life and activity; and there are HUMAN ends, arising from the adaptation of many things to man's corporeal senses, and still more from the adaptation of many things to his mental capacities. This distinction between the different kinds of ends which may be discoverable in the various works of nature, is clearly marked at the outset, and steadily kept in view throughout, both as a guide directing us to the different objects of inquiry, and as a guard warning us against the folly of expecting to explain all the complicated phenomena of nature; and its use in this latter respect is strikingly illustrated by the objection which has often been raised against the goodness of God, and which must have suggested itself still more frequently to the thoughtful reflection of men, the objection, we mean, arising from the fact that many tribes of animals are by nature carnivorous, having been so framed that they must necessarily prey on one another. Some sensitive minds have recoiled from this arrangement, as inconsistent with the goodness and benevolence of God; whereas when we raise our views from mere animal and human ends to those which are cosmical, and, above all, to those which are -Divine, we shall see at a single glance that a much larger amount both of life and happiness may be found in the universe in con

sequence of this very arrangement than could have existed with out it, and a much more varied and abundant manifestation given of the monos aopra" the manifold wisdom of God."no Having marked the distinction between the different classes of ends which ought to be kept in view in such inquiries, Mr. Boyle proceeds: to show, that while it might be presumptuous, as Descartes allegedy to expect that we should be able to discover all the purposes which are served by any of these arrangements, yet that some ends or uses may be so clearly manifest as to force themselves on our notice and belief, and that in reference to these there is no presumption, but on the contrary a plain and imperative duty in volved in the study of final causes. In a scheme so vast and complicated, all the ends of God may not be equally intelligible; but some may be so self-evident that we must abjure reason itself, as well as religion, if we professed to feel the slightest doubt in regard to them. That the eye was made for the purpose of seei ing, and the ear for the purpose of hearing; that food was designed to nourish, and the digestive organs ordained to receive and assimilate the nourishment thus provided; that the sexes were mutually adapted to each other, with a view to the continu ance of the race; these and a thousand other instances of intelligible design in the works of nature, are so undeniable, that no man can doubt the fact of fitness or adaptation, however some may shrink from the theological inference that is based on that fact; and in reference to all such cases we should not feel ourselves debarred from marking the evidence of design by reason of the multitude of other cases in which the precise design can not be explained, any more than we should desist from the philo sophical explanation of the phenomena of nature by reason of the remaining mysteries which science has failed to solve. il Descartes had admitted the being and perfections of God, not only as cer tain and necessary truths, but as cognizable by the human faculties; and Mr. Boyle contends that it is at least as reasonable to expect some manifestation of God in the works of external natures as to excogitate a proof from the conceptions of our own minds and that no more presumption is implied in the one process than in the other. It is the subject, and not the mode of manifesta! tion, which is so high and inscrutable; and if God has been pleased to exhibit the impress of His perfections, whether on the matter which He has organized or the minds which He has calle ed into being, it is our duty to inquire where light is given, and to adore even where we cannot fully comprehendered of awoda am1992 "Tutor Tot bob stutitedure of bewolle ed ow vino 9From the fact, that Bacon and Descartes, the founders of the two rival schools of modern speculation, did equally, though onl different grounds, proscribe the use of final causes in philosophy

Laplace, Cabanis, and Geoffroy St. Hilaire. I

98

it might have been expected that the influence of their senti ments would continue to operate on their successors, and that, both among the inductive and the idealistic writers of modern times, some might be found tinctured with a feeling of jealousy and suspicion. Accordingly we find, among the philosophical writers both of France and England, some who have evinced a tendency, and even avowed a determination, to disparage this branch of study. Thus Laplace represents the evidence of final causes as receding and disappearing before the advance of science, and as existing only in cases where our remaining igno rance surrounds it with a cloud of mystery."Let us run over the history of the progress of the human mind and its errors, we shall perpetually see final causes pushed away to the bounds of its knowledge. These causes, which Newton removed to the limits of the solar system, were not long ago conceived to obtain in the atmosphere, and employed in explaining meteors : they are therefore, in the eyes of the philosopher, nothing more than the expression of the ignorance in which we are of the real causes." And so Cabanis, the physiologist, says, "I regard, with the great Bacon, the philosophy of final causes as barren.""I take care," says Geoffroy St. Hilaire, "not to ascribe to God any intention! I ascribe no intention to God, for I mistrust the feeble power of my reason. I observe facts merely, and go no farther."

t

It is remarkable, however, that while such was the tendency of philosophical speculation, neither the alleged authority of Bacon, nor the reasonings of Descartes, nor the contemptuous sneers of French and English infidelity, had any considerable effect in shaking the popular belief, or impairing the confidence of the public mind, in the great argument from design: few or none were found to doubt in consequence that their eyes were made for seeing, and their ears for hearing, or to deem it in any respect presumptuous to entertain such a belief. It is equally remarkable, that the very philosophers who professedly abjured the recognition of final causes, did often, in their writings, make use of expressions which really implied all that is meant by the doctrine of a manifest purpose in Nature, as if they had been be trayed unconsciously into the acknowledgment of that doctrine, even while they were carefully guarding against it. Thus La place, speaking of the arrangements on which the stability of thes solar system depends, uses language which Mr. Whewell shows to be precisely that of the advocates of natural theology, if only we be allowed to substitute God for nature. "It seems,' says the,that nature (say God) has ordered everything in the heavens to ensure the duration of the planetary system, by means similar to those which He appears to us so admirably to follow

upon the earth, for the preservation of animals and the perpe tuity of species." And so, while Cabanis regards the philosophy of final causes as barren, he frankly acknowledges that, in treating of the works of nature, it is very difficult for "the most cautious man (l'homme le plus reservé) never to have recourse to them in his explanations." The fact is, that the volume of nature is entirely unintelligible, except in so far as we are en abled to read there the language of order and design.

The relations subsisting between science and theology are so intimate, that the speculations of the schools respecting final causes could scarcely fail to affect more or less the literature of the Church and it is interesting to mark the influence and trace the development of philosophical views in connexion with their visible effects in the writings of our divines. The popular theology of this country, that which constitutes the staple and substance of public religious belief, has been little affected by the subtleties of philosophical speculation: it has been drawn direct either from the pure fountain of the word, or from the living wells of nature and if it has been occasionally tinctured by an infusion of mere human opinions, it could not amalgamate at least with views which were seen to be at variance with its simplest and sublimest truths. The natural evidence for the being and perfections of God, arising from the marks of design and wisdom in the visible monuments of creation and the wonderful works of Providence, was never felt to be invalidated by the specious exceptions which were made to it, and never lost its hold of the public mind, even when a sceptical philosophy was in the ascendant. The practical character of British intellect, and the strong common-sense tendency of British speculation, which have sometimes exposed us to the insulting scorn, and the still more insulting pity, of our continental neighbours,* have served

* COUSIN himself, in his earlier writings, seems to have undervalued British intellect. Surely it was the Frenchman, not the philosopher, that spoke from the chair, when addressing the ingenuous youth of France, he thus commented on the intellectual character of England :-"L'Angleterre, Messieurs, est une île assez considérable: en Angleterre tout est insulaire tout s'arrète en certaines limites; rien ne s'y développe en grand. L'Angleterre n'est pas destituée d'invention mais l'histoire déclare qu'elle n'a pas cette puissance de généralisation et de déduction qui seul pousse une idée, un principe à son entier développement, et en tire tout ce qu'il renferme." England is an island, no doubt: but the sea which girds her shores is the highway of the world; and her old "wooden-walls" have served to keep open a communication with all nations. "L'Angleterre, proprement dite, depuis quelque temps, je dirais presque depuis un demi-siécle, n'a plus payé sa part de recherches philosophiques à la civilisation Européenne: il n'est sorti de l'Angleterre aucun ouvrage célèbre en métaphysique.' "On peut dire que l'Angleterre et l'Ecosse, qui ont toujours exercé une assez faible influence sur la philosophie Européenne, ont cessé d'en avoir aucune. Les deux grandes nations philosophiques de l'Europe sont aujourd'hui l'Allemagne et la France."-The

Victor Cousin's Historic Cycles. mol

11

a noble purpose, and saved us from formidable dangers, by keeping our eye steadily fixed on the facts of nature and experience, while others were tempted to wander after the ignis fatuus of metaphysical abstraction; and the general result has been, a firm conviction of the validity and value of the evidence arising from final causes, as that evidence has been stated and illus trated by the sagacious Paley, the learned lectureship of Boyle, and the series of Bridgewater Essayists.

But some recent indications lead us to suspect that a portion, at least, of our divines, may have been more deeply infected than we had previously supposed, with the spirit of jealousy and suspicion against the Natural Evidence of Theology, which previous philosophical writings were fitted to inspire. It cannot be unseasonable, therefore, and we trust it may be interesting to cast our eye abroad over the state and tendencies of European thought, and to inquire in what direction the tide is likely to flow-what the dangers with which we may have to contend-what the means of defence which it may be wise and politic to prepare.

In his brilliant lectures on the History of Philosophy, VICTOR COUSIN has exhibited a graphic sketch of the progress of human opinion, and has attempted to show that it advances in a series of successive cycles, each cycle containing four concentric circles:-The first in order, is Sensationalism, or the system which ascribes all our knowledge to the information derived through our corporeal organs; the second, Idealism, which erects its lofty superstructure on the phenomena and laws of our mental consciousness; the third is SCEPTICISM, which springs up from the constant collision and controversy between the two former systems; and the fourth is Mysticism, which arises from the despair of reason, the religious instincts of nature, and the felt want of faith. In tracing the historical development of human thought, he thinks that it may be shown to have described this cycle of systems, in the same order, at each of the great eras in the past: and he illustrates his opinion by referring to the philosophy of India, the philosophy of Greece, the philosophy of the Middle Ages, and the philosophy of Modern Europe-each hav ing commenced with sensationalism, then risen to idealism, then sunk into scepticism, and then sprung up into mysticism. Not

richest morsel remains:-"Messieurs! qui a été le vainqueur qui a été le vaincu -à Waterloo! Messieurs, il n'y a pas eu de vaincus! (Applaudissemens.) Non, je proteste qu'il n'y en a pas eu les seuls vainqueurs ont été la civilisation Européenne et la charte. (Applaudissemens unanimes et prolongés.)-More recently, however, he has done ample justice, (as in his Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy,) to the genius and character of the Scottish school; and has taken occasion to pay a striking and well-merited tribute to the Presbyterian system, which has contributed so largely to develop our national thought.