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ing locatio; the locatio should still continue, but with the buyer as locator in place of the seller. An important variety of the locatio conductio was the hiring of labor. Instead of a house or a horse, a workman might give his own body, his physical powers, to be used by one who agreed to pay him for the use. To this head was referred, not only what we are wont to speak of as hired service, but also the job-work of artisans. If Titius, being a jeweller, received gold from Aulus, which, for a payment agreed on between them, he was to fashion into a ring, this was a locatio operis (letting of work). If, however, the material, the gold, was furnished by the jeweller, the contract was not regarded as one of letting and hiring, but as one of buying and selling: Aulus in that case bought the ring from Titius.

Third, societas (or partnership). This was an agreement between two or more persons, whereby they engaged that such and such property, specified in the transaction, should be held by them in common, and used for their common gain and profit. This last idea, of a lucrative use, as the aim of the societas, was an essential element in the contract. Without it there might be a communio bonorum, a joint ownership of undivided property, such as often arose without any contract, by gift, or legacy, or inheritance, etc.; but there could not be a societas in the law-sense of the term. For this lucrative use the socii (or partners)

might agree to have all their property, with all their acquisitions and liabilities, in common: that was a societas totorum bonorum. Or they might contribute only certain parts of their property to the common stock; and they might limit their common operations to some particular kind or kinds of business; that was a societas alicujus negotiationis. The contributions of the parties to the common stock might be very unequal: it might even be that a party contributed nothing, the others being perhaps induced to receive him by the expectation of valuable services. But whatever the ratio of their contributions, it was always assumed in law, unless otherwise expressed in the contract, that the parties were all equally interested in the societas, all entitled to equal shares in its gains if it was successful, or bound to equal shares in its losses if it was unsuccessful. Yet by express statement in the contract, any proportions of gain or loss might be established among the parties. Thus, it might be arranged that one party should have three-fourths of the gain, but only one-fourth of the loss; or even that one should have three-fourths of the gain, but none of the loss. But an arrangement by which one party should have all the gain was not recognized as binding; it was considered as contrary to the nature and purposes of the societas, the aim of which was gain for all the parties concerned. Such an arrangement the lawyers called societas leonina, a partnership like that which

the lion in the fable imposed upon the cow, the sheep, and the she-goat, his associates in the chase.

Fourth, mandatum (commission). This was an agreement by which one party engaged to fulfil without compensation some mandate or order given to him by the other party. I say, "without compensation." It will be understood, of course, that the giver of the mandate could make any return he pleased for the service rendered him. He might even bind himself in other ways, as by a formal stipulation, to make some return. But he could not bind himself to this in the contract of mandate; or rather the contract, if it contained such an engagement, was a mandate no longer: it might be a case of locatio conductio (a case of hired labor), or it might be one of those real contracts without special name which became binding only by the fulfilment of one party. The mandatary (as he was called), the receiver of the order, was bound of course to execute the service which he promised; and on the other hand, the mandator (the giver of the order) was bound to pay all expenses necessarily and properly incurred by the mandatary in the discharge of his trust. The mandate was employed among the Romans for a great variety of business purposes. In law-proceedings especially its employment was very extensive. If Aulus had a suit at law, whether as plaintiff or defendant, and was unable to conduct it in person, from necessary absence, or pressure of occupation, or lack

of legal knowledge, or from any other cause, he could give Titius a mandate to conduct the case as procurator security was then offered to the court that Aulus would accept and ratify the acts of his procurator Titius. And Titius might also be appointed by mandate procurator in rem suam (manager for his own interest); and by accepting such appointment he made the case his own, with all its chances of gain or loss. If Aulus had a claim against Seius, even though he had never brought it to a prosecution, he could transfer it to Titius by a mandate of this kind, appointing him procurator in rem suam; and Titius then had all the same rights and liabilities in the matter that Aulus had had before. If Aulus had obtained by stipulation from Seius the promise of a hundred aurei, he could by such a mandate transfer or cede the obligation, make it over to Titius, so that practically Titius instead of Aulus should become creditor by the stipulation. This, in fact, was the process already alluded to, as the one oftenest used for escaping the difficulty, which the requirement of personal presence in stipulations occasioned in business affairs.

The most important obligations have now been enumerated and described. The few which remain must be taken up in the next lecture, after which we shall attend to the general nature of obligations, and to some special classes which need to be distinguished among them.

LECTURE X.

LAW OF OBLIGATIONS (CONTINUEd),

As in the four consensual contracts the mere agreement of parties created a perfect obligation, so also it did in pacta adjecta, subordinate agreements annexed to any binding contract (never to stipulation or mutuum); so also in constitutum, agreement to fulfil a previous (even imperfect) obligation.

Obligations quasi ex contractu arose from various causes, as guardianship; joint ownership of undivided property; solutio indebiti (payment of a mistakenly supposed debt); negotiorum gestio (service rendered in a sudden emergency, which forbade waiting for a mandate), etc.

Obligations from DELICT. Besides the punishment of his crime, the wrong-doer was liable to the injured party in damages, which might exceed the amount of injury, and thus be a poena (private-law penalty).— (a) Furtum: the thief must restore the property stolen or an equivalent, and pay as poena its quadruple or double value, according as the furtum was manifestum or nec manifestum (reason for the difference).—(b) Rapina: the robber must pay fourfold, which included the value of the property taken and a threefold poena.—(c) Damnum injuria datum (wrongful injury to property): the offender, by the Lex Aquilia, must pay the highest price which the injured property would have brought within thirty days before the act; or if a slave was killed, or a domestic quadruped, the highest within twelve months before. Same liability for culpable carelessness as for design.-(d) Injuria (outrage to one's person) might consist in violence (to man himself or members of his household), or in slander, or in mere insult. Roman sensitiveness to ridicule.

Master liable, by actio noxalis, for delict of slave: might escape by giving up slave. Compare actio de pauperie against owner of vicious animal. Obligation quasi ex delicto, on a judex for unjust decision, etc.

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