250

RELIGIOUS LIBERTY.

[ESSAY III qualify for public office; except, in some cases, a mere verbal assent to the truth of the Christian religion.-While I was in New-York," adds Duncan, "the sheriff of the city was a Jew."*-It is vain to make any objection to the argument which these facts urge, unless we can show that the effect is not good. And where is the man who will even affect to do this? But if it should be said that what is wise and expedient with such national institutions as those of America would be unwise and inexpedient with such institutions as those of England or Spain, it will become a most grave inquiry, whether the fault does not lie with the institutions that are not adapted to religious liberty:-for religious liberty is assuredly adapted to man.

Observe what absurdities this sacrifice of universal rectitude to particular institutions occasions. There may be ten nations on a continent, each of which selects a different creed for its preference, and excludes all others. The first excludes all but Catholics,-the second all but Episcopalians, the third all but Unitarians,—the fourth all but the Greek Church; and so on with the rest. If it be right that Unitarians should be intrusted with power on one side of a river, can it be right that they shall not be intrusted with it on the other? Or, if such an absurdity be really conducive to the support of the incongruous institutions of the several states, is it not an evidence that those institutions need to be amended? And are not the principles of perfect religious liberty, nevertheless, sound and true?

Englishmen have not to complain of a want of toleration. But toleration is a word which ought scarcely to be heard out of a Christian's mouth. I tolerate the religion of my brother! I might as well say I tolerate the continuance of his head upon his shoulders. I have no more right to hold his creed at my disposal, or his person in consequence of his creed, than his head. The idea of toleration is a relic of the effects of the papal usurpation. That usurpation did not tolerate and Protestants thought it was a great thing for them to do what the papacy had thus refused. And so it was. It was a great thing for them. Very imperfectly, however, they did it; and it was a great thing for Penn, who was brought up in a land of intolerant Protestants, to declare universal toleration for all within his borders. But-(and we may reverently say, Thanks be to God!)—we live in happier times. We have advanced from intolerance to toleration; and now it is time to advance from toleration to religious liberty: to that religious liberty which excludes all reference to creeds from the civil institutions of a people.

The reader will perhaps have observed, that religious liberty and reli gious establishments are incompatible things. An establishment presupposes incomplete religious liberty. If an establishment be right, religious liberty is not; and if religious liberty be right, an establishment is not. Differently constituted religious establishments may no doubt, impose greater or less restraint upon liberty; but every idea of an establishment of a church preferred by the state-imposes some restraint. It is the same with tests. A test, of some kind, is necessary to a church

* Duncan's Travels in America.

CHAP. 4.1

"THE CATHOLIC QUESTION."

251

thus preferred by the state; for how else shall it be known who is a member of that church, and who is not? Religious liberty is incompatible with religious tests; for which reason again, all arguments by which this liberty is shown to be right are so many proofs that religious tests are wrong. These considerations the reader will be pleased to bear in mind, when he considers the question of religious establishments.

Tests are snares for the conscience. If their terms are so loose that any man can take them with a safe conscience, they are not tests. If their terms are definite, they make many hypocrites. Men are induced to assent, or subscribe, or perform (whatever the requisitions of the test may be), against their consciences, in order to obtain the advantages which are contingent upon it. An attempt was once made in England to introduce an unexceptionable test; by which the party was to declare "that the books of the Old and New Testaments contained, in his opinion, a revelation from God." But whom did this exclude ? Perhaps Deists, Mahometans, Pagans, Jews. But, as a snare, the operation was serious; for, simple as the test appears, it was liable to great uncertainty of meaning. Did it mean that all the books contained a revelation? Then some think that all the books are not authentic. Did it mean that there was a revelation in some of the books of the Bible? Then Jews, Mahometans, Pagans, and some Deists might, for aught that I know, conscientiously take it. No unexceptionable test is possible. There are, to be sure, gradations of impropriety; and in England we have not always resorted to the least objectionable. It was well observed by Charles James Fox, that "the idea of making a religious rite the qualification for holding a civil employment is more than absurd, and deserves to be considered as a profanation of a sacred institution."

A few, and only a few, sentences will be allowed to the writer upon the great, the very great question of extending religious liberty to the Catholics of these kingdoms. I call it a very great question, not because of the difficulty of deciding it, if sound principles are applied, but because of the magnitude of the interests that are involved, and of the consequences which may follow if those principles are not applied.— The reader will easily perceive, from the preceding contents of this chapter, the writer's conviction, that full religious liberty ought to be extended to the Catholics, because it ought to be extended to all men. If a Catholic acts in opposition to the public welfare,-diminish or take away his freedom. If he only thinks amiss,-let him enjoy his freedom undiminished.

To this I know of but one objection that is worth noticing here,that they are harmless only because they have not the power of doing mischief, and that they wait only for the power to begin to do it. But they say, "This is not the case, we have no such intentions." Now, in all reason, you must believe them, or show that they are unworthy of belief. If you believe them, religious liberty follows of course. Can you then show that they are unworthy of belief? Where is your evidence?

You say, their allegiance is divided between the king and a foreign power. They reply, "It is not ""We hold ourselves bound, in con

252

"THE CATHOLIC QUESTION."

[ESSAY III. science, to obey the civil government in all things of a temporal and civil nature, notwithstanding any dispensation to the contrary from the pope or Church of Rome."

You say, their declarations and oaths do not bind them, because they hold that they can be dispensed from the obligation of all oaths by the pope. They reply, "We do not:" "We hold that the obligation of an oath is most sacred; that no power whatsoever can dispense with any oath, by which a Catholic has confirmed his duty of allegiance to his sovereign, or any obligation of duty to a third person."

You say, they hold that faith is not to be kept with heretics.-They reply," We do not." "British Catholics," say they, "have solemnly sworn that they reject and detest that unchristian and impious principle, that faith is not to be kept with heretics or infidels." These declarations are taken from a "Declaration of the Catholic Bishops, the Vicars Apostolic, their coadjutors in Great Britain:" 1825. They are signed by the Catholic bishops of Great Britain, and are approved in an " address" signed by eight Catholic peers and a large number of other persons of rank and character.

Now I ask of those who contend for the Catholic disabilities, What proof do you bring that these men are trying to deceive you? I can anticipate no answer, because I have heard none. Will you then content yourselves by saying, We will not believe them? This would be at least the candid course, and the world might then perceive that our conduct was regulated, not by reason, but by prejudice, or the consciousness of power. "It is unwarrantable to infer, a priori, and contrary to the professions and declarations of the persons holding such opinions, that their opinions would induce acts injurious to the common weal."

But if nothing can be said to show that the Catholic declarations do not bind them, something can be said to show that they do. If declarations be indeed so little binding upon their consciences, how comes it to pass that they do not make those declarations which would remove their disabilities, get a dispensation from the pope, and so enjoy both the privileges and an easy conscience? Why, if their oaths and declarations did not bind them, they would get rid of their disabilities to-morrow! Nothing is wanting but a few hypocritical declarations, and Catholic emancipation is effected. Why do they not make these declarations? Because their words bind them. And yet (so gross is the absurdity), although it is their conscientiousness which keeps them out of office, we say they are to be kept out because they are not conscientious!

I forbear further inquiry: but I could not with satisfaction avoid applying what I conceive to be the sound principles of political rectitude to this great question; and let no man allow his prejudices or his fears to prevent him from applying them to this, as to every other political subject. Justice and truth are not to be sacrificed to our weaknesses and apprehensions; and I believe, that if the people and legislature of this country will adhere to justice and truth with regard to our Catholic brethren, they will find, ere long, that they have only been delaying the welfare of the empire.

* C. J. Fox: Gifford's Life of Pitt, vol. ii.

CHAP. 5.1

CIVIL OBEDIENCE.

253

CHAPTER V.

CIVIL OBEDIENCE.

Submission to government is involved in the very idea of the institution. None can govern if none submit: and hence is derived the duty of submission, so far as it is independent of Christianity. Government being necessary to the good of society, submission is necessary also, and therefore it is right.

66

This duty is enforced with great distinctness by Christianity :-" Be subject to principalities and powers."-" Obey magistrates."-"Submit to every ordinance of man."-The great question, therefore, is, whether the duty be absolute and unconditional; and if not, what are its limits, and how are they to be ascertained?

The law of nature proposes few motives to obedience except those which are dictated by expediency. The object of instituting government being the good of the governed, any means of attaining that object is, in the view of natural reason, right. So that, if in any case a government does not effect its proper objects, it may not only be exchanged, but exchanged by any means which will tend on the whole to the public good. Resistance,-arms,-civil war,-every act is, in the view of natural reason, lawful if it is useful. But although good government is the right of the people, it is, nevertheless, not sufficient to release a subject from the obligation of obedience, that a government adopts some measures which he thinks are not conducive to the general good. A wise pagan would not limit his obedience to those measures in which a government acted expediently; because it is often better for the community that some acts of misgovernment should be borne, than that the general system of obedience should be violated. It is, as a general rule, more necessary to the welfare of a people that governments should be regularly obeyed, than that each of their measures should be good and right. In practice, therefore, even considerations of utility are sufficient, generally, to oblige us to submit to the civil power.

When we turn from the law of nature to Christianity, we find, as we are wont, that the moral cord is tightened, and that not every means of opposing governments for the public good is permitted to us. The consideration of what modes of opposition Christianity allows, and what it forbids, is of great interest and importance.

"Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers. For there is no power but of God: the powers that be are ordained of God. Whosoever, therefore, resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God. For rulers are not a terror to good works, but to the evil.-He is the minister of God to thee for good,—a revenger, to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil. Wherefore ye must needs be subject, not only for wrath, but also for conscience' sake."*-Upon this often-cited and often-canvassed passage, three things are to be observed:

* Rom. xiii. 1–5.

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EXTENT OF THE DUTY OF OBEDIENCE.

[ESSAY III 1. That it asserts the general duty of civil obedience because government is an institution sanctioned by the Deity.

2. That it asserts this duty under the supposition that the governor is a minister of God for good.

3. That it gives but little other information respecting the extent of the duty of obedience.

I. The obligation to obedience is not founded, therefore, simply upon expediency, but upon the more satisfactory and certain ground, the expressed will of God. And here the superiority of this motive over that of fear of the magistrate's power is manifest. We are to be subject, not only for wrath, but for conscience' sake,—not only out of fear of man, but out of fidelity to God. This motive, where it operates, is likely, as was observed in the first essay, to produce much more consistent and conscientious obedience than that of expediency or fear.

II. The duty is inculcated under the supposition that the governor is a minister for good. It is upon this supposition that the apostle proceeds: "For rulers are not a terror to good works, but to the evil;" which is tantamount to saying, that if they be not a terror to evil works but to good, the duty of obedience is altered. "The power that is of God," says an intelligent and Christian writer, leaves neither ruler nor subject to the liberty of his own will, but limits both to the will of God; so that the magistrate hath no power to command evil to be done because he is a magistrate, and the subject hath no liberty to do evil because a magistrate doth command it."* When, therefore, the Christian teacher says, "Let every soul be subject to the higher powers," he proposes not an absolute but a conditional rule,-conditional upon the nature of the actions which the higher powers require. The expression, "There is no power but of God," does not invalidate this conclusion, because the apostles themselves did not yield unconditional obedience to the powers that were. Similar observations apply to the parallel passage in 1st Peter:-"Submit yourselves to every ordinance of man for the Lord's sake; whether it be to the king as supreme, or unto governors as unto them that are sent by him, for the punishment of evil-doers, and for the praise of them that do well." The supposition of the just exercise of power is still kept in view.

III. The precepts give little other information than this respecting the extent of the duty of obedience. "Whosoever resisteth the power resisteth the ordinance of God," is, like the direction to "be subject," a conditional proposition. What precise meaning was here attached to the word "resisteth" cannot, perhaps, be known; but there is reason to think that the meaning was not designed to be precise, that the proposition was general. "Magistrates are not to be resisted,"-without defining, or attempting to define, the limits of civil obedience.

Upon the whole, this often-agitated portion of the Christian Scriptures does not appear to me to convey much information respecting the duties of civil obedience; and although it explicitly asserts the general duty of obedience to the magistrate, it does not inform us how far that duty extends, nor what are its limits. To say this, however, is a very dif ferent thing from saying, with Dr. Paley, that "As to the extent of our civil rights and obligations, Christianity hath left us where she found us; that she hath neither altered nor ascertained it; that the New Testament

Crisp "To the Rulers and Inhabitants in Holland, &c." Abt. Ann. 1670