CHAP. 6. J

OMPLIMENTARY UNTRUTHS

145

tions on the scale of evil: and it is not the part of wisdom to approach the verge of guilt. Nor is it to be forgotten, that language professedly fictitious is not always understood to be such by those who hear it. This applies especially to the case of children,—that is, of mankind during that period of life in which they are acquiring some of their first notions of morality. The boy who hears his father using hyperboles and irony with a grave countenance probably thinks he has his father's example for telling lies among his schoolfellows.

Among the indefensible untruths which often are not lies, are those which factitious politeness enjoins. Such are compliments and complimentary subscriptions, and many other untruths of expression and of action which pass currently in the world. These are no doubt often estimated at their value: the receiver knows that they are base coin, though they shine like the good. Now, although it is not to be pretended that such expressions so estimated are lies, yet I will venture to affirm that the reader cannot set up for them any tolerable defence; and if he cannot show that they are right he may be quite sure that they are wrong. A defence has however been attempted: "How much is happiness increased by the general adoption of a system of concerted and limited deceit! He from whose doctrine it flows that we are to be in no case hypocrites, would, in mere manners, reduce us to a degree of barbarism beyond that of the rudest savage."- -We do not enter into such questions as whether a man may smile when his friend calls upon him, though he would rather just then that he had staid away. Whatever the reader may think of these questions, the "system of deceit" which passes in the world cannot be justified by the decision. There is no fear that " a degree of barbarism beyond that of the rudest savage" would ensue, if this system were amended. The first teachers of Christianity, who will not be charged with being in "any case hypocrites," both recommended and practised gentleness and courtesy.* And as to the increase of happiness which is assumed to result from this system of deceit, the fact is of a very questionable kind. No society I believe sufficiently discourages it; but that society which discourages it probably as much as any other certainly enjoys its full average of happiness.-But the apology proceeds, and more seriously errs: "The employment of falsehood for the production of good cannot be more unworthy of the Divine Being than the acknowledged employment of rapíne and murder for the same purpose."+ Is it then not perceived that to employ the wickedness of man is a very different thing from holding its agents innocent? Some of those whose wickedness has been thus employed have been punished for that wickedness. Even to show that the Deity has employed falsehood for the production of good would in no degree establish the doctrine that falsehood is right.

The childish and senseless practice of requiring servants to "deny" their masters, has had many apologists,-I suppose because many perceive that it is wrong. It is not always true that such a servant does not in strictness lie: for, how well soever the folly may be understood by the gay world, some who knock at their doors have no other idea than that they may depend upon the servant's word. Of this the servant is sometimes conscious, and to these persons, therefore, he who denies his

* 1 Peter ii. 1. Tit. iii. 2. 1 Peter iii. 8.

+ Edin. Rev. vol i. Art. Belsham's Philosophy of the Mind.

K

146

FALSEHOODS OF LEGAL DOCUMENTS.

[ESSAY II. master lies. An uninitiated servant suffers a shock to his moral principles when he is first required to tell these falsehoods. It diminishes his previous abhorrence of lying, and otherwise deteriorates his moral character. Even if no such ill consequences resulted from this foolish custom, there is this objection to it, which is short but sufficient,-nothing can be said in its defence.

Among the prodigious multiplicity of falsehoods which are practised in legal processes, the system of pleading not guilty is one that appears perfectly useless. By the rule, that all who refused to plead were presumed to be guilty, prisoners were in some sort compelled to utter this falsehood before they could have the privilege of a trial. The law is lately relaxed; so that a prisoner, if he chooses, may refuse to plead at all. Still, only a part of the evil is removed, for even now, to keep silent may be construed into a tacit acknowledgment of guilt, so that the temptation to falsehood is still exhibited. There is no other use in the custom of pleading guilty or not guilty, but that, if a man desires to acknowledge his guilt, he may have the opportunity; and this he may have without any custom of the sort. It cannot be doubted that the multitude of falsehoods which obtain in legal documents during the progress of a suit at law, have a powerful tendency to propagate habits of mendacity. A man sells goods to the value of twenty pounds to another, and is obliged to enforce payment by law. The lawyer draws up, for the creditor, a Declaration in Assumpsit, stating that the debtor owes him forty pounds for goods sold, forty pounds for work done, forty pounds for money lent, forty pounds for money expended on his account, forty pounds for money received by the debtor for the creditor, and so on, and that two or three hundred pounds being thus due to the creditor, he has a just demand of twenty pounds upon the debtor! These falsehoods are not onehalf of what an every day Declaration in Assumpsit contains. If a person refuses to give up a hundred head of cattle which a farmer has placed in his custody, the farmer declares that he "casually lost" them, and that the other party "casually found" them: and then, instead of saying he casually lost a hundred head of cattle, he declares that it was a thousand bulls, a thousand cows, a thousand oxen, and a thousand heifers!*-I do not think that the habits of mendacity which such falsehoods are likely to encourage are the worst consequences of this unhappy system, but they are seriously bad. No man who considers the influence of habit upon the mind can doubt that an ingenuous abhorrence of lying is likely to be diminished by familiarity with these extravagant falsehoods.

* See the Form, 2 Chitty on Pleading, p. 370.

"An oath is that whereby we call God to witness the truth of what we say, with a curse upon ourselves, either implied or expressed, should it prove false."*

66

A CURSE. Now supposing the Christian Scriptures to contain no information respecting the moral character of oaths, how far is it reasonable, or prudent, or reverent, for a man to stake his salvation upon the truth of what he says? To bring forward so tremendous an event as everlasting destruction from the presence of the Lord," in attestation of the offence perhaps of a poacher, or of the claim to a field, is surely to make, unwarrantably, light of most awful things. This consideration applies, even if a man is sure that he speaks the truth: but who is, beforehand, sure of this? Oaths in evidence, for example, are taken before the testimony is given. A person swears that he will speak the truth. Who, I ask, is sure that he will do this? Who is sure that the embarrassment of a public examination, that the ensnaring questions of counsel, that the secret influence of inclination or interest, will not occasion him to utter one inaccurate expression? Who, at any rate, is so sure of this that it is rational, or justifiable, specifically to stake his salvation upon his accuracy? Thousands of honest men have been mistaken; their allegations have been sincere, but untrue. And if this should be thought not a legiti mate objection, let it be remembered that few men's minds are so sternly upright that they can answer a variety of questions upon subjects on which their feelings, and wishes, and interest are involved, without some little deduction from the truth, in speaking of matters that are against their cause, or some little over-colouring of facts in their own favour. It is a circumstance of constant occurrence, that even a well-intentioned witness adds to or deducts a little from the truth. Who then, amid such temptation, would make, who ought to make, his hope of heaven depend ent on his strict adherence to accurate veracity? And if such considerations indicate the impropriety of swearing upon subjects which affect the lives, and liberties, and property of others, how shall we estimate the impropriety of using these dreadful imprecations to attest the delivery of a summons for a debt of half-a-crown!

These are moral objections to the use of oaths independently of any reference to the direct moral law. Another objection of the same kind is this: To take an oath is to assume that the Deity will become a party

* Milton: Christian Doctrine, p. 579.

148

MATT. V. 33.-OATHS OF THE ANCIENT JEWS.

[ESSAY II in the case, that we can call upon Him, when we please, to follow up by the exercise of His almighty power, the contracts (often the very insignificant contracts) which men make with men. Is it not irreverent, and for that reason immoral, to call upon him to exercise this power in reference to subjects which are so insignificant that other men will scarcely listen with patience to their details? The objection goes even further. A robber exacts an oath of the man whom he has plundered, that he will not attempt to pursue or to prosecute him. Pursuit and prosecution are duties; so then the oath assumes that the Deity will punish the swearer in futurity if he fulfils a duty. Confederates in a dangerous and wicked enterprise bind one another to secrecy and to mutual assistance, by oaths, assuming that God will become a party to their wickedness, and if they do not perpetrate it will punish them for their virtue.

Upon every subject of questionable rectitude that is sanctioned by habit and the usages of society, a person should place himself in the independent situation of an inquirer. He should not seek for arguments to defend an existing practice, but should simply inquire what our practice ought to be. One of the most powerful causes of the slow amendment of public institutions consists in this circumstance, that most men endeavour rather to justify what exists than to consider whether it ought to exist or not. This cause operates upon the question of oaths. We therefore invite the reader, in considering the citation which follows, to suppose himself to be one of the listeners at the mount,—to know nothing of the customs of the present day, and to have no desire to justify them. "Ye have heard that it hath been said by them of old time, Thou shalt not forswear thyself, but shall perform unto the Lord thine oaths. But I say unto you, Swear not at all: neither by heaven, for it is God's throne; nor by the earth, for it is his footstool; neither by Jerusalem, for it is the city of the Great King. Neither shalt thou swear by thy head, because thou canst not make one hair white or black. But let your communication be yea yea, nay nay; for whatsoever is more than these cometh of evil."

If a person should take a New Testament and read these words to ten intelligent Asiatics who had never heard of them before, does any man believe that a single individual of them would think that the words did not prohibit all oaths? I lay stress upon this consideration: if ten unbiased persons would, at the first hearing, say the prohibition was universal, we have no contemptible argument that that is the real meaning of the words. For to whom were the words addressed? Not to schoolmen, of whom it was known that they would make nice distinctions and curious investigations; not to men of learning, who were in the habit of cautiously weighing the import of words,-but to a multitude,—a mixed and unschooled multitude. It was to such persons that the prohibition was addressed; it was to such apprehensions that its form was adapted. "It hath been said of old time, Thou shalt not forswear thyself." Why refer to what was said of old time? For this reason assuredly; to point out that the present requisitions were different from the former; that what was prohibited now was different from what was prohibited before. And what was prohibited before? Swearing falsely,-swearing and not performing. What then could be prohibited now? Swearing truly,-swearing, even, and performing: that is, swearing at all; for it is manifest tha

Matt. v. 33-37.

CHAP. 7.]

MILTON -PALEY.

149

if truth may not be attested by an oath, no oath may be taken. Of old time it was said, "Ye shall not swear by my name falsely."* 66 "If a man swear an oath to bind his soul with a bond, he shall not break his word." There could be no intelligible purpose in contradistinguishing the new precept from these, but to point out a characteristic difference, and there is no intelligible characteristic difference but that which denounces all oaths. Such were the views of the early Christians. "The old law," says one of them, " is satisfied with the honest keeping of the oath, but Christ cuts off the opportunity of perjury." In acknowledging that this prefatory reference to the former law is in my view absolutely conclusive of our Christian duty, I would remark, as an extraordinary circumstance, that Dr. Paley, in citing the passage, omits this introduction, and takes no notice of it in his argument.

"I say unto you, Swear not at all." The words are absolute and exclusive.

"Neither by heaven, nor by the earth, nor by Jerusalem, nor by thy own head." Respecting this enumeration it is said that it prohibits swearing by certain objects, but not by all objects. To which a sufficient answer is found in the parallel passage in James. "Swear not," he says; "neither by heaven, neither by the earth, neither by any other oath." This mode of prohibition, by which an absolute and universal rule is first proposed and then followed by certain examples of the prohibited things, is elsewhere employed in Scripture. "Thou shalt have no other gods before me. Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image, or any likeness of any thing that is in heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the water under the earth." No man supposes that this after-enumeration was designed to restrict the obligation of the law,-Thou shalt have no other gods before me. Yet it were as reasonable to say that it was lawful to make idols in the form of imaginary monsters because they were not mentioned in the enumeration, as that it is lawful to swear any given kind of oath because it is not mentioned in the enumeration. Upon this part of the prohibition it is curious that two contradictory opinions are advanced by the defenders of oaths. The first class of reasoners say, the prohibition allows us to swear by the Deity, but disallows swearing by inferior things. The second class say, the prohibition allows swearing by inferior things, but disallows swearing by the Deity. Of the first class is Milton. The injunction, he says, "does not prohibit us from swearing by the name of God,--we are only commanded not to swear by heaven, &c." But here again the Scripture itself furnishes a conclusive answer. It asserts that to swear by heaven is to swear by the Deity: "He that shall swear by heaven sweareth by the throne of God, and by Him that sitteth thereon."** To prohibit swearing by heaven is therefore to prohibit swearing by God. Among the second class is Dr. Paley. He says, "On account of the relation which these things [the heavens, the earth, &c.] bore to the Supreme Being, to swear by any of them was in effect and substance to swear by Him; for which reason our Saviour says, Swear not at all; that is, neither directly by God nor indirectly by any thing related to him." But if we are thus prohibited from swearing by any thing related to Him, how happens it that Paley proceeds to justify judicial oaths?

*Lev. xix. 12.

+ Numb. xxx. 2. + Basil. | Exod. xx. 3. See also xx. 4. Christian Doctrine, p. 582. Moral and Political Philosophy, b. 3, p. 1, c 16.

James v. 12. **Matt. xxiii. 22.