12 lb. 260—262, 352.) Nor will a change of domicil impair a right to personal property, the title to which has become perfect under the laws of a State of our Union, or of a foreign nation. (11 Wheat. 369, 371.)

A law of a State, purporting to legislate as to a remedy for collecting debts, which takes away a part of the security pledged by a contract to a creditor at the passage of the law, is a law impairing the obligation of existing contracts by retrospective action, and violates the consti-. tutional prohibition against State laws impairing the obligation of contracts. (Bronson vs. Kenzie, 1 How. 311, 315, 316. 3 Ib. 717. 1 Ib. 320. 8 Wheat. 1, 71, 75, 84.)

In Murray vs. Gibson, (15 How. R. 423-425,) the Supreme Court of the United States decided that statutes of limitations, and other statutes, are not to be construed to have a retroactive operation, unless such construction is unavoidable; but that they are to be deemed to speak for the future, as a general rule.

That as a general rule, courts adopt the interpretation of State statutes given by their respective highest tribunals, provided it does not conflict with the paramount authority of the national constitution or laws of the United States binding upon their own courts, or with the fundamental principles of justice and common right.

The Code Napoleon says: "The law ordains for the future only; it has no retrospective operation."

By change of remedies on contracts, existing rights cannot be taken away. (1 How. U. S. R. 316, 319. 8 Wheat. 1, 75, 76, 84. 3 How. 717. 8 Ib. 320. 14 Ib. 488.)

These principles govern the effect of State laws, when a suit is brought in any court, whether national, State or foreign court.

When a suit is brought in any State court of our Union, the statute of limitations of the lex fori governs, as that

law regulates the remedy, though incidentally affecting the rights of parties. (13 Pet. 324-327.)

This is so when a suit is brought on a judgment recovered in another State, as well as on contracts. (13 Pet. 327.)

Laws, being rules for conduct and ascertainment of right, are in their nature prospective. Retrospective laws, taking away or impairing rights of property, except under the right of eminent domain, when exercised under an act of Congress for a national object, or a State law for public use and upon full compensation, are condemned by natural equity, and ought to be held illegal and void in all tribunals.

SEC. 15. The right of eminent domain attaches to all property rights of every sort, to realty, personalty, to franchises, and to all rights secured by contract or otherwise. It has been debated whether a State granting a charter to a company to erect a bridge, establish a bank for a given period, could, by virtue of the right of eminent domain, take such franchise and connected property of a corporation, prior to the expiration of the charter, on full payment of damages duly assessed. (18 Wend. 13. 13 How. 71. 23 Pick. 360. 6 How. U. S. R. 531, 532.)

Article 5th of the amendments of the Constitution of the United States limits the power of Congress to taking private property, by virtue of the right of eminent domain, to cases where it is needed for national public use, and upon payment of a just compensation. It presupposes the power in Congress and the national government, and limits its exercise. (Barrow vs. The City of Baltimore, 7 Pet. R. 243.) Congress may judge of the necessity of taking private property for such public use, and so may the President and Senate in making treaties. The decision of Congress on that point must, upon principle, be final, and if full compensation is made to the owners of

the property taken, no judicial tribunal can review the questions of public necessity or public use. (9 Barb. N. Y. R. 350, ch. 5, § 19.)

In Cushman vs. Smith, the Supreme Court of Maine, by its able Chief Justice Shepley, decided in this case: 1st. That the clause in American constitutions, prohibiting the taking of private property for public use without compensation, does not prohibit a legislature from authorizing an exclusive occupation of private property temporarily, as an incipient proceeding to the acquisition of title to it, or to an easement. 2d. That it prevents a permanent taking, occupation or appropriation of it, for public use, without the actual payment or tender of a just compensation for it. 3d. That an unreasonable delay in such payment or tender would defeat such incipient right of occupancy. 4th. That an action of trespass will lie for such occupancy, accompanied with unreasonable delay of payment or tender. 5th. That, in such cases of delay, an action of trespass on the case may be maintained to recover damages for all injuries occasioned by prior occupation. And it was decided, in that case, that such an action of trespass was sustainable against the incipient occupants, who had failed to reasonably pay or tender payment for the land proposed to be taken, by virtue of a right of eminent domain.

In the case of Bonaparte vs. The Camden and Amboy Rail-Road Co., (1 Baldwin's C. C. R. 205, 216,) a bill in equity was filed to prevent the defendants from locating a rail-road through the plaintiff's pleasure grounds at Bordentown, N. J., on the ground of irreparable injury to the estate of plaintiff, an alien.

Judge Baldwin decided that the 11th section of the Judiciary Act gave jurisdiction to the Circuit Court in all cases of a civil nature at law or in equity, (1 Story, 57,) independently of any State law; and that as an alien, the

plaintiff had a right to sue in the United States Circuit Court for an injury to his lands in New-Jersey, just as though he lived in a foreign country.

The learned judge held, that though a State cannot be sued, that its agents might be prosecuted in reference to money actually collected and paid into the State Treasury, if illegally obtained, (9 Wheat. 743,) and that the defendants, as agents of the State, might be sued for their acts, if illegal. (pp. 217, 218.)

That government has the power to take private property for public use, of the necessity or expediency of which it must judge, but that the obligation to make just compensation is concomitant with that right. (pp. 220, 221, 226.)

That a canal, rail-road or other like corporation or association, is public where the law secures to the public a right of passage thereon by paying a reasonable, stipulated, uniform toll. (p. 223.)

That an entry for exploration of a route for a road, canal, &c., is not a taking of the land, and that when nothing further is done, there is no right to compensation; but if the company commit wanton acts, or do unnecessary damage, they are trespasses, otherwise the law protects the entry. (p. 226, and cites 20 Johns. R. 104, 740. 7 Johns. Ch. R. 342–344. See, also, 9 Barb. S. C. R. 449.)

SEC. 16. In all cases of the exercise of the right of eminent domain, the law authorizing it ought to provide a legal remedy for the recovery of full payment of the damages to be assessed. (Const. U. S. Amend. art. 5. 7 Pet. 243-247.) The 6th section of the Constitution of the State of New-York, of 1846, secures this right; and in all cases where the compensation is not to be made by the State, it is to be ascertained by a jury, or by not less than three commissioners appointed by a court of record,

as shall be prescribed by law. Chancellor Walworth, in giving the opinion of the Court of Errors, in Bloodgood vs. M. & H. Rail-Road Co., (18 Wend. 18,) speaking of paying for land taken by virtue of the right of eminent domain, says: "The compensation must be either ascertained and paid to him before his property is thus appropriated, or an appropriate remedy must be provided, and upon an adequate fund; whereby he may obtain such compensation through the medium of the courts of justice, if those whose duty it is to make such compensation refuse to do so." (2 Denio's R. 472.)

Where property is taken for public use, as a canal or other improvement, it seems that the owners of all adjacent lands ought to be compensated for all direct and material injuries arising from public works, and the constitutional provision in spirit would fairly reach them. Thacher vs. A. & S. Rail-Road Co., 25 Wend. 464. 18 Ib. 1. 2 Denio's R. 433, 450. 2 Kent's Com. 5th ed. 339, 340, n.)

SEC. 17. Municipal corporations, its officers or persons designated by a State law, or any person on whom the duty of public protection devolves, may, in a case of actual necessity, to prevent the spreading of a fire, the advance of an hostile army, the ravages of a pestilence or any other great calamity, destroy the private property of any individual, for the protection or safety of the many, without subjecting the actors to personal responsibility for the damages which the owner has sustained. (2 Denio, 474. 18 Wend. 129-131. 25 Ib. 173—175. 2 Kent's Com. 4th ed. 338.) In such cases, the sufferers can be compensated so far only as a statute, if any, shall provide. (2 Denio, 461.)

Such acts of destruction are not founded on the right of eminent domain, but of necessity. No compensation can be recovered, unless it is provided for by the local