$550

against him in favor of any person or have not be sued in any district other than that made a transfer of any of his property, and of which he is an inhabitant. if, at the time of the transfer, or of the entry [3] Of the objection based on the pendenof the judgment, or of the recording or register-cy of the suit in the state court in Collin ing of the transfer if by law recording or registering thereof is required, and *being within four county it is enough to say that the trustee months before the filing of the petition in bank- is not a party to that suit and that it has ruptcy or after the filing thereof and before the none of the elements of a suit to avoid the adjudication, the bankrupt be insolvent and the transfer in question. Whether if this were judgment or transfer then operate as a prefer- otherwise it would affect the jurisdiction of ence, and the person receiving it or to be ben- the court below as a court of the United efited thereby, or his agent acting therein, shall States we need not consider. See Louisville then have reasonable cause to believe that the Trust Co. v. Knott, 191 U. S. 225, 24 Sup. enforcement of such judgment or transfer would Ct. 119, 48 L. Ed. 159; Courtney v. Pradt, effect a preference, it shall be voidable by the trustee and he may recover the property or its 196 U. S. 89, 25 Sup. Ct. 208, 49 L. Ed. 398; value from such person. And for the purpose Mississippi Railroad Commission v. Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co., 225 U. S. 272, of such recovery any court of bankruptcy, as hereinbefore defined, and any state court which 279, 32 Sup. Ct. 756, 56 L. Ed. 1087. would have had jurisdiction if bankruptcy had not intervened, shall have concurrent jurisdiction." 1

Sections 1 (8) and 2 (Comp. St. §§ 9585, 9586) define "courts of bankruptcy" as including the several District courts of the United States, and section 2 (20) invests the courts of bankruptcy with power to "exercise ancillary jurisdiction over persons or property within their respective territorial limits in aid of a receiver or trustee appointed in any bankruptcy preceedings pending in any other court of bankruptcy."

[4] We conclude that the court should have overruled the objections urged against its jurisdiction, but we intimate no opinion on the merits other than that the case made

by the bill has enough of substance to en-
title the plaintiff to a decision therein in the
court below in regular course. See Geneva
Furniture Co. v. Karpen, 238 U. S. 254, 258,
259, 35 Sup. Ct. 788, 59 L. Ed. 1295.
Decree reversed.

In re TRACY.

1919.)

(249 U. S. 551)

1. HABEAS CORPUS 45(1)—ORIGINAL PROCEEDING IN SUPREME COURT.

In the absence of exceptional conditions, other competent courts may not be passed by, and the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court invoked for redress by habeas corpus. 2. HABEAS CORPUS 117(1)

The amendments are couched in plain words and effect a material change in the jurisdiction of suits by trustees to avoid pref- (Submitted April 21, 1919. Decided April 28, erential transfers and recover the property or its value under section 60b. The exception ingrafted on section 23b takes such suits out of the restrictive provisions of that section; the sentence added to section 60b makes them cognizable in the courts of bankruptcy, as well as in such state courts as could have entertained them if bankruptcy had not intervened; and the new clause in section 2 dispels any doubt that otherwise might exist respecting the power of a court of bankruptcy other than the one in which the bankruptcy proceeding is pending to entertain such a suit where the property sought to be recovered is within its territorial limits.

SUCCESSIVE APPLICATIONS.

-

REFUSAL

Where Supreme Court denies application for habeas corpus, because relief should have first been asked for in other competent courts, a motion for leave to renew application in a District Court is unnecessary.

Motion for Leave to Renew Application
for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the United
States District Court for the District of
Colorado.

On motion for leave to renew application
Denied.
for writ of habeas corpus.
For former report, see 249 U. S. 588, 39
Sup. Ct. 385, 63 L. Ed.

[2] The court below is a court of bankruptcy and the property in question is within its territorial limits, so the jurisdiction under the terms of the Bankruptcy Act is plain. The suit is a local one in the sense of section 54 of the Judicial Code (Comp. St. 1036) and this enabled the court to reach the defendant, who resides in another district in the same state, by original process sent to and served in the district of his residence. Such a suit, apart from the terms PER CURIAM. For the purpose of reof the Bankruptcy Act, is excepted by sec-dressing assumed violations of the Constitution 51 of the Code (Comp. St. § 1033) from tion and laws of the United States by means the general provision that a defendant may of habeas corpus the jurisdiction of other 1 A sentence like that in italics was added to sec-competent courts to afford relief may not be tions 67e and 70e by chapter 487, 32 Stat. 797. passed by and the original jurisdiction of

Mr. C. M. O'Neill, of Seattle, for petitioner.

For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

*552

REDUCTION IN COMPETITION WITH WATER
ROUTE-FINDING BY COMMISSION.

this court be invoked, in the absence of ex-13. CARRIERS 31 — RATES-INCREASE AFTER ceptional conditions justifying such course. Matters v. Ryan, 249 U. S. 375, 39 Sup. Ct. 315, 63 L. Ed. 654, decided April 14, 1919. [2] When leave to file the petition for habeas corpus was previously denied (249 U. S. 588, 39 Sup. Ct. 385, C3 L. Ed. —), without a suggestion as to the existence of any exceptional condition which would have justified a contrary view, such refusal presumably was based on the existence of the right to seek, if desired, other and appropriate sources of relief. From this it follows that although we pass the application of the doctrine that the refusal of habeas corpus is not the thing adjudged precluding a subsequent granting of such writ *upon the same facts, nevertheless there is here no reason to grant the order prayed, since the previous order rested upon the right and duty to petition for relief, if habeas corpus was desired, to other and appropriate sources of judicial power.

No reason, therefore, exists for granting the motion, and to avoid any implication of a necessity which does not obtain, the motion is denied.

(249 U. S. 557)

SKINNER & EDDY CORPORATION v.
UNITED STATES et al.

(Argued March 11, 1919. Decided May 5, 1919.)

1. COMMERCE

-ENJOINING

No. 215.

ENFORCEMENT-JURISDICTION.

Act to Regulate Commerce, § 4, last paragraph, amended by Act June 18, 1910, § 8 (Comp. St. § 8566), providing that when a carroute, reduce rates, it shall not be permitted to rier by rail shall, in competition with a water increase such rates unless after hearing by the Interstate Commerce Commission it shall be found that the proposed increase rests on changed conditions other than the elimination of water competition, held, when construed in the light of the purpose of its enactment, of the earlier paragraphs of the section, and of other sections in the Act to Regulate Commerce designed to prevent unjust discrimination, not to apply where reduction in rates was, with the approval of the tered on application of the carrier for relief commission, given after hearing, by order enfrom operation of the section, the specific purpose of which was to prevent discrimination by charging less for the longer haul, unless in the opinion of the commission the circumstances made it just.

4. CARRIERS 31-RATES-INCREASE AFTER

REDUCTION-CHANGED CONDITIONS-ELIMI-
NATION OF WATER COMPETITION.

Changed conditions found by Interstate Commerce Commission held to be something other than the "elimination of water competition" which Congress intended should not justify raising rates reduced by a carrier by rail in competition with a water route.

5. COMMERCE 85-RATES-INCREASE AFTER REDUCTION-APPLICATION BY CARRIER. Application by carrier is not a prerequisite to an order of Interstate Commerce Commission

96-COMMISSIONER'S ORDERS allowing increase of long-haul rates, which on a fourth section application by carrier it has allowed to be reduced; necessarily implied in such The courts have jurisdiction to enjoin in-order being "till otherwise ordered by the comcrease of rates under authority of order of In- mission," Interstate Commerce Act, § 4, as terstate Commerce Commission, and that with- amended by Act June 18, 1910, § 8 (Comp. St. § out redress being first sought in a proceeding 8566), providing that "the commission may from before the commission, where the claim is not time to time prescribe the extent to which such that the rate is unjust as unreasonably high or * * * carrier may be relieved from the operadiscriminatory, but that the commission has tion of this section," and the original applicaexceeded its authority, and therefore the order tion being always subject to be reopened. is void, in view of Act to Regulate Commerce, § 4, as amended by Act June 18, 1910, § 8 (Comp. St. § 8566), last paragraph prescribing conditions on which, only, an increase shall be permitted, where a carrier by rail shall in competition with a water route reduce rates.

2. COMMERCE

92-ORDER OF COMMISSIONSUIT TO SET ASIDE JURISDICTION. Within Act Oct. 22, 1913 (Comp. St. § 994), declaring venue of suit to set aside order of Interstate Commerce Commission to be the district wherein is the residence of the party or any of the parties on whose petition the order was made, the carriers making fourth section applications (constituting the proceedings) wherein the order was made, and not the other parties (a merchants' association and a state railroad commission) whose applications were instrumental in securing a reopening of the proceedings resulting in the order, are the parties whose residence is controlling.

Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the District of Oregon.

Suit by the Skinner & Eddy Corporation against the United States and others. Bill dismissed, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed. *Mr. Joseph N. Teal, of Portland, Or., for appellant.

Mr. Assistant Attorney General Frierson, for the United States.

Mr. Albert L. Hopkins, of Washington, D. C., for appellee Interstate Commerce Commission.

Mr. John F. Finerty, of St. Paul, Minn., for appellee Railroad Companies.

Mr. Justice BRANDEIS delivered the opinion of the Court.

The last paragraph of section 4 of the Act

For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

099

to Regulate Commerce (Act Feb. 4, 1887, c. | ticles, 38 Interst. Com. Com'n R. 237. The 104, 24 Stat. 380), as amended by Act June carriers soon thereafter filed tariffs making 18, 1910, c. 309, § 8, 36 Stat. 539, 547 (Comp. that reduction *effective April 10, 1916; and St. § 8566), declares that: on that date, the 65-cent rate became operative.

eral applications of carriers, including that | Ct. 370, 59 L. Ed. 616; Los Angeles Switchof March 1, 1916, authorizing the 65-cent ing Case, 234 U. S. 294, 311, 34 Sup. Ct. 814, Pittsburgh-Seattle rate; and the carriers 58 L. Ed. 1319; Kansas City Southern Ry. were directed to reduce the degree of dis- Co. v. United States, 231 U. S. 423, 440, 34 crimination then existing in favor of Pacific Sup. Ct. 125, 58 L. Ed. 296, 52 L. R. A. (N. Coast ports as against intermediate terri- S.) 1; Procter & Gamble Co. v. United tory. States, 225 U. S. 282, 297, 298, 32 Sup. Ct. 761, 56 L. Ed. 1091; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 222 U. S. 541, 32 Sup. Ct. 108, 56 L. Ed. 308. But plaintiff does not contend that 75 cents is an unreasonably high rate, or that it is discriminatory, or that there was mere error in the action of the commission. The contention is that the commission has exceeded its statutory powers; and that, hence, the order is void. In such a case the courts have jurisdiction of suits to enjoin the enforcement of an order, even if the plaintiff has not attempted to secure redress in a proceeding before the commission. Interstate Com*merce Commission v. Diffenbaugh, 222 U. S. 42, 49, 32 Sup. Ct. 22, 56 L. Ed. 83; Louisiana & P. Ry. Co. v. United States (Com. C.) 209 Fed. 244, 251; Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission (Com. C.) 194 Fed. 449, 451. Sacramento Case, supra, was a case of this character. Compare Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co., 227 U. S. 88, 92, 33 Sup. Ct. 185, 57 L. Ed. 431; Southern Pacific Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 219 U. S. 433, 31 Sup. Ct. 288, 55 L. Ed. 283. The District Court properly assumed jurisdiction of this suit.

Upon entry of this order the carriers filed tariffs effective September 1, 1916, raising, among others, the Pittsburgh-Seattle iron and steel rates from 65 cents to 94 cents. Promptly, on August 4, 1916, Skinner & Eddy Corporation protested, requested that the tariffs effective September 1, 1916, raising, had thereon, and alleged that the proposed increase violated, as later set forth in its bill of complaint, the last paragraph of the fourth section. Their request was not then granted. Thereafter, by action of the commission and the carriers, not necessary to detail, the effective date of the tariff fixing the 94-cent rate was postponed to December 30, 1916; and meanwhile these tariffs were, with consent of the commission, canceled upon the understanding that new tariffs fixing a 75-cent rate effective on that day would be filed. When the 75-cent rate was filed, Skinner & Eddy Corporation again protested on the same ground, and made, as theretofore, the same request for a suspension of the tariffs and a hearing; and again the request was not granted.

[2] Second. The defendants contend, also, that if the subject-matter was within the jurisdiction of a District Court of the United States, it was not within that of Oregon. The objection is based upon Act Oct. 22, 1913, c. 32, 38 Stat. 208, 219 (Comp. St. § 994), which declares:

part, any order of the Interstate Commerce Commission shall be in the judicial district wherein is the residence of the party or any of the parties upon whose petition the order was made."

[1] First. The defendants contend that the District Court did not have jurisdiction of the subject-matter of this suit; because orders entered in a fourth section proceeding cannot be assailed in the courts; at least, not until after a remedy has been sought under sections 13 and 15 of the Act to Regulate Commerce (Comp. St. §§ 8581, 8583). This contention proceeds apparently upon a misapprehension of plaintiff's position. If plaintiff had sought relief against a rate or prac-enforce, suspend, or set aside, in whole or in "The venue of any suit hereafter brought to tice alleged to be unjust because unreasonably high or discriminatory, the remedy must have been sought primarily by proceedings before the commission, Loomis v. Lehigh Valley Railroad Co., 240 U. S. 43, 50, 36 Sup. Ct. 228, 60 L. Ed. 517; Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. American Tie & Timber Co., 234 U. S. 138, 146, 34 Sup. Ct. 885, 58 L. Ed. 1255; The Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352, 419, 33 Sup. Ct. 729, 57 L. Ed. 1511, 48 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1151, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 18; Robinson v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., 222 U. S. 506, 32 Sup. Ct. 114, 56 L. Ed. 288; Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. v. Pitcairn Coal Co., 215 U. S. 481, 30 Sup. Ct. 164, 54 L. Ed. 292; and the finding thereon would have been conclusive, unless there was lack of substantial evidence, some irregularity in the proceedings, or some error in the application of rules of law; Manufacturers' Ry. Co. v. United States, 246 U. S. 457, 482, 38 Sup. Ct. 383, 62 L. Ed. 831; Pennsylvania Co. v. United States, 236 U. S. 351, 361, 35 Sup.

And it is asserted that the parties upon whose petition the order was made are the Merchants' Association of Spokane, a resident of the Eastern district of Washington, and the Railroad Commission of Nevada, a resident of the district of Nevada. The applications of these parties, filed in March, 1916, were doubtless instrumental in securing a reopening of the proceedings which resulted in the order complained of. But the proceedings in which the order was made were the original application of carriers for relief under the fourth section. The report and the order are entitled, "In the Matter of Reopening Fourth Section Applications." One of the carriers which had made such application for relief from the provisions of the fourth section was a resident of Oregon, namely, the

*563

to Regulate Commerce (Act Feb. 4, 1887, c. | ticles, 38 Interst. Com. Com'n R. 237. The 104, 24 Stat. 380), as amended by Act June carriers soon thereafter filed tariffs making 18, 1910, c. 309, § 8, 36 Stat. 539, 547 (Comp. that reduction *effective April 10, 1916; and St. § 8566), declares that: on that date, the 65-cent rate became operative.